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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Motivation 
Over the last couple of decades, globalization and other factors have significantly 
changed the business environment. In today’s competitive marketplace, firms are facing 
significant on-going challenges. The customers are not only concerned about the price of 
and quality the product, but also about the life cycle cost associated with product 
maintenance, recovery and disposal. Hence, lowering the life cycle cost (LCC) of the 
product is an important target for companies, which will increase the product’s value and 
attractiveness to the customer. Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) 
greatly influences the life cycle cost of the product. The more reliable and maintainable 
the product is, the lower is its life cycle cost. It is widely recognized that the costs 
associated with RAM over the product’s life cycle can outweigh other costs in many 
sectors. For space programs, operational support costs typically comprise 60% to 80% of 
total program cost (Montgomery 1996) ; for the supersonic fighter aircraft or subsonic 
transport/bomber, the cost (excluding fuel) of engines constitutes at least two-thirds of 
the total engine life-cycle cost(Nelson 1977). Consideration of RAM characteristics early 
in the product design stages can reduce the LCC. The typical product life-cycle can be 
divided into five phases (John, Loy et al. 2003 ): the need analysis & specification phase, 
the conceptual & preliminary design phase, the detail design & development phase, the 
manufacturing, production & construction phase, the system operational, support, and 
disposal phase. The ease of change of a design decreases rapidly as the design progresses 
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in time. Incurred cost also is also low at the beginning of the life cycle, but increases 
rapidly in the detail design and manufacturing phases, as shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
Life cycle phases: 1: need analysis & specification, 2: conceptual & preliminary, 3: detail design & development, 4: 
manufacturing, production & construction, 5: system operation, support & disposal 
Figure 1.1: Cost incurred, ease of change for various life cycle phases (John, Loy et al. 
2003 ) 
When the maintainability and reliability issues are addressed in the early phases, 
there will be fewer design iterations and design changes in the detail design phase. This is 
because potential issues are investigated more thoroughly and resolved in the design 
process. The earlier the design flaws are detected, the lower the costs and associated 
efforts needed to eliminate them. Furthermore, the cost drivers for operation and 
maintenance can also be identified in the early phase of the product design.  Once cost 
drivers are identified, the corrective measures can be taken to avoid the induced 
maintenance costs by choosing another design alternative or by choosing better materials, 
etc.  
5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
100% 
Ease of  Change 
Cost  incurred 
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In order to make the product more attractive to the customer and achieve the most 
economic life cycle cost, one needs to account for the effect of reliability/availability on 
LCC upfront in the design stage and choose the best alternative that reduces the total cost. 
Hence, developing proper models to accurately estimate the reliability/availability and 
maintainability aspects of a design upfront in product development is a key requirement 
for proper analysis and management of life-cycle costs. 
1.2 Research Objective 
The accurate estimation and management of the system reliability/availability 
during the early stages of new product development is not only critical for managing 
product development and manufacturing costs but also for reducing the LCC. In this 
regard, the overall objective of this research study is to develop an integrated framework 
for “design for reliability” (DFR) during upfront product development by truly treating 
reliability as a design parameter. The aim here is to develop the theory, methods, and 
tools necessary for:  
1) Accurate assessment of system reliability/availability in the product development 
stages. 
2) Optimization of the design to meet system reliability/availability targets. 
In modeling the system reliability and availability, we aim to address the 
limitations of existing methods, in particular the Markov chains method and the Dynamic 
Bayesian Network approach, by incorporating a Continuous Time Bayesian Network 
(CTBN) framework for more effective modeling of sub-system/component interactions, 
dependencies, and various repair policies. We also propose a multi-object optimization 
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scheme to aid the designer in obtaining optimal design(s) with respect to system 
reliability/availability targets and other system design requirements. In particular, the 
optimization scheme would entail optimal selection of sub-system and component 
alternatives  by taking multiple criteria into consideration. The theory, methods, and tools 
to be developed are extensively tested and validated using simulation test-bed data and 
actual case studies from industry examples.  
1.3 Organization of Thesis 
Chapter 2 presents the review of literature. Section 1 gives the concepts, 
definitions and assumptions in Reliability, Maintainability and Availability modeling of 
the reparable systems. Section 2 gives an overview of the different quantitative RAM 
modeling methods currently used and their limitations. Section 3 presents the relevant 
research on system design optimization analysis, with a focus on optimization methods.  
Chapter 3 proposes a new CTBNs RAM modeling formalism. The proposed 
approach addresses the issue of estimating the reliability (availability) for repairable 
system, which has dynamic interactions among components or is subject to different 
repair policies. The mapping from dynamic gates of Dynamic Fault trees to CTBNs is 
discussed and the modeling of various repair policies in CTBNs is investigated. Three 
case examples from the literature and industry applications are discussed to demonstrate 
the approach.  
Chapter 4 presents an integrated framework for system design optimization 
analysis. The integrated framework is based on CTBNs and NSGA-II. The main 
functionality of this framework is to find the optimal system configuration by taking 
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multiple requirements (reliability/availability, cost and weight et al) into consideration. 
The RAM modeling formalism (proposed in Chapter 3) is employed to estimate the 
system reliability (availability) and the system design problem is treated as a black-box 
multi-objective optimization problem. We used NSGA-II to solve this multi-objective 
optimization problem. Finally, a ground vehicle system design case study example is 
presented to demonstrate the proposed approach.  
Chapter 5 proposes a modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method which can identify 
all Pareto-optimal solutions for the linear multi-objective optimization problem. The 
existing adaptive ϵ-constraint method is improved by adding a checking scheme to avoid 
solving for the duplicate solutions, and thus speed up the algorithm significantly. The 
proposed method is applied to two typical system design problems: The Redundancy 
Allocation Problem (RAP) for Series-Parallel systems and the configuration selection 
problem.  
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by summarizing contributions of the research and 
discussion of future research directions.  
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Chapter 2 RAM Modeling and System Design Optimization: Literature 
Review 
 
In this chapter, the concepts, definitions and assumptions of repairable systems 
are given in Section 2. Section 3 gives an overview of the different quantitative RAM 
modeling methods being used currently. Section 4 presents the relevant research on 
system design optimization analysis, including the system metric (reliability/availability) 
estimation approaches and the system optimization methods.  
2.1 Repairable Systems 
The repairable system is a system which would be subject to repair actions 
(including the replacement) to bring it back to operating state when it fails. It is defined 
as contrast to non-repairable system, which is defined as that cannot be repaired or do not 
necessary to be repaired when fails. For example, a vehicle is a repairable system. When 
the transmission of the vehicle is down, what you need to do is just to repair the 
transmission or replace a new one instead of dumping the whole vehicle. As for non-
repairable system, such as the rocket, if the launch fails, the rocket will explode or burn 
in the sky; it cannot be repaired. Other example such as chips in in the computer, if the 
CPU fails, we will replace it with a new one; nobody would repair a chip. However, in a 
computer system, if the chip fails and it is replaced by a new one, the chip is non-
repairable; but the computer system can be considered as a reparable system in system 
level. Sometimes, a component is totally replaced by a new one also can be considered as 
repairable in system level.  
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2.1.1 System Dynamic Behaviors 
In this study, dynamic behaviors refer to the functional dependences or 
interactions among components or subsystems in the system. Most common dynamic 
behaviors are already summarized and modeled by Dynamic Fault trees (Dugan 2000; 
Dugan, Sullivan et al. 2000), which is an extension of traditional fault trees to handle 
failure sequence (or temporal) and functional dependencies. The basic dynamic gates 
include the PEDP gate, the WSP gate and the PAND gate. We will describe these 
dynamic gates in details in later chapters. In this study, we mainly focus on proposing the 
CTBNs to model these dynamic gates.   
2.1.2 Perfect Repair 
For a repairable system, in component level, the components are subjected to 
failure if not periodically and properly maintained. If failed, they have to be repaired. The 
type of repair conducted defines the performance of the component. Perfect repair 
(Mettas and Zhao 2004) brings the component to an as good as new state; while minimal 
repair makes the component as good as it was immediately before failure. In this study, 
perfect repair is considered. We assume that when component failed, the repair action 
will restore its operating state to be as good as new. In the background of this study, we 
also assume that all failure time and repair time of component are following exponential 
distribution. The failure rate for each component can be estimated from various available 
data, like the field data, test data and similar product data et al. 
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2.1.3 Repair Policies 
In system level, a repair process can have several characteristics. The repair target 
can be a single component or a subsystem consists of a set of components. In the latter 
case, the repair completion time can be the same for all components in that subsystem, or 
the time to repair component may be different from one to another. When repairing a 
subsystem, all components are repaired in that subsystem or just a minimal subset 
allowing the subsystem to be operative again. The repair crews can be limited or 
unlimited. The order to repair components can be specified, the more critical a 
component is, the higher repair priority it will have. Furthermore, the activation of repair 
process of a component or subsystem can be a failure of the same component or 
subsystem, etc.  
In this study, several repair policies are considered and the time to repair a 
component or a subsystem follows exponential distribution with the repair rate of that 
component or subsystem. 
(1). Subsystem repair policy. The repair of a subsystem is activated by the failure of the 
subsystem itself, as soon as it occurs. There are 3 kinds of subsystem repair policies 
(Raiteri, Fraceschinis et al. 2004; Portinale, Raiteri et al. 2010):  
o Subsystem Global Repair policy (SGR): all the components in the subsystem are 
under repair and the repair is completed at the same time for all the components. 
The time to repair follows exponential distribution with a repair rate.  
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o Subsystem Local Repair policy (SLR): for a subsystem, all its components are 
influenced by the repair process, but the time to repair each of them may be 
different from one to another (each component has its own repair rate).  
o Minimal Subsystem Local Repair policy (SLR-min): the extension of SLR, where 
the repair of the subsystem components is interrupted as soon as the subsystem is 
available again, i. e. when a minimal subset of components necessary to recover 
the system, is repaired. In this case, some of subsystem components may not be 
repaired.  
(2). Component repair policy. The repair of a single component is activated by the failure 
of the component itself, as soon as it occurs. There are also 2 kinds of component repair 
policies.  
o Component Repair policy (CR): concerns the repair of a single component. The 
time to repair the component can be different from one to another. 
o Component Repair policy with limited repair crews (CR-limit). The only different 
of this policy and the CR policy is that, for a system or subsystem, the number of 
repair crews is limited. 
If there is not redundancy in the system, all subsystem repair policies mentioned 
above will become component repair policy. In a system without any redundancy, if one 
component fails, then it will bring down the whole system. Thus in this kind of system, 
subsystem repair policies are identical to component repair policies. Furthermore, without 
redundancy, even if a single component fails, then it will bring down the whole system; 
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all components are equally important. Thus there is not minimal subset of components 
can recover the system. The “SLR-min” policy is not practical in this kind of system. 
2.1.4 System Metrics 
For a repairable system, beside reliability, the availability is another more 
important system metric need to be considered. Availability is defined as the probability 
that the system is operational at a given time,  (i.e. has not failed or it has been restored 
after failure). Availability is a performance criterion for repairable systems that accounts 
for both the reliability and maintainability properties of a system. The definition of 
availability is somewhat flexible and there are a number of different classifications of 
availability. In this study, we focus on two kinds of availabilities (Reliasoft 2011), the 
instantaneous (point) availability and the mean availability. For the three case examples 
in Chapter 4, we estimated the point availability in the first example (the Cardiac system) 
for evaluating the proposed method, by comparing its result with results of other methods 
taken from literatures; for the ground vehicle and the fleet of vehicles example, the mean 
availability is a more practical metric for this kind of application. We calculate the mean 
availability in these two case examples.  
Instantaneous (point) Availability ()  
Instantaneous (point) availability is the probability that a system will be 
operational at any random time	. This is very similar to the reliability function in that it 
gives a probability that a system will function at the given time	. Unlike reliability, the 
instantaneous availability measure incorporates maintainability information. At any given 
time	, the system will be operational if the following conditions are met: 
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The item functions properly from 0 to  with probability 	() or it functions properly 
since the last repair at time	
, 0 < 
 < , with probability: 
 	( − 
)(
)
  
with (
) being the renewal density function of the system. 
Then the point availability is the summation of these two probabilities, or: 
() = 	() +  	( − 
)(
)
  
Mean Availability () 
The mean availability is the proportion of time during a mission or time period 
that the system is available for use. It represents the mean value of the instantaneous 
availability function over a period [0	] and is given by: 
() =   ()  
The mean availability also can be express in a simple way. For a time period	[0	], 
!" is the system up time, the total amount of time the system is available for use. The 
mean availability can be estimated by: 
() = #$  
2.2 RAM Modeling Methods: Literature Review 
The RAM modeling methods can be broadly divided into two main categories: 
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o Analytical techniques. 
o Simulation techniques.  
Analytical techniques basically describe the system model in term of 
mathematical equations. The techniques can produce exact or approximate1 analytical 
solutions to the mathematical equations. Example of such solutions includes the closed-
form solution to a set of ordinary differential equations, known as the Chapman-
Kolmogorov equations for Markov chains.  
Simulations techniques are essentially a way to generate sample paths (i.e. runs), 
and statistically estimated the measures of interest from those sample paths. Simulation is 
a versatile tool that can be applied to any real-world system. However, these techniques 
are computationally heavy (i.e. usually we need a high number of runs to get an 
acceptable result). In reliability analysis, the Monte Carlo based Petri Net method 
(Portinale and C. 2009) is a stochastic simulation technique.  
In this study, we only focus on analytical techniques. From a system standpoint, 
the analytical techniques can divide them into two classes: reliability modeling methods 
for non-repairable system and RAM modeling methods for repairable systems. In this 
subsection, we discuss them separately.  
Reliability Modeling Methods for Non-repairable Systems 
There are numerous methods available for reliability modeling; among them, the 
Fault tree and its extension Dynamic Fault trees (DFT)(Dugan, Bavuso et al. 1992), 
                                                           
1
 From a practical standpoint, some mathematical equations are usually solved using a particular numerical 
algorithm, and therefore computing an approximate solution. 
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solved by Markov chains (MCs) (Dugan, Bavuso et al. 1993; Dugan 2000), are the basic 
reliability modeling approaches. However, in practical application, MC-based DFT 
methods have a space state explosion problem(Boudali and Dugan 2005), which leads to 
long computational times and/or intractable solutions.  
Recently, a number of studies have attempted to use the Bayesian Network (BN) 
and its extensions to model and analyze the reliability of complex system. By introducing 
new modeling features (multi-state variables, noisy gates, common cause failures et al.), 
BNs have been shown to increase both the modeling capabilities and analysis power of 
combinational based models. Works on system safety and Bayesian Networks, developed 
by Bobbio (Bobbio, Portinale et al. 2001), explain how to map static Fault trees into 
Bayesian Networks and show the obvious superiority of BNs over MC-based FTs in 
terms of modeling and analysis capabilities.  
However, one limitation of conventional BNs is that, it cannot capture dynamic 
behaviors among subsystems or components. Two kinds of BN extensions are studied to 
make up this shortfall. The first one is the interval-based approach Discrete-Time 
Bayesian Networks (DTBNs)(Boudali and Dugan 2005). In this paper, Boudali proposes 
an interval-based DTBN for reliability modeling and analysis. The main character of 
DTBNs is that the time line is divided into finite number of intervals and all of these 
intervals are the state space for each node. The state of a node locating in an interval 
represents the failure event of the node that occurs in that interval. By using this BN time 
representation, it is possible to account for the temporal dependencies among the system 
components and event-dependent failure behaviors, avoiding the state space explosion 
problem of MC-based approach. The authors also show how to map DFT gates into 
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DTBNs. In the paper(Boudali and Dugan 2006), the authors make a further extension of 
DTBNs and present another formulism of BN named Continuous-Time Bayesian 
Networks (CTBNs, although this work is different from the CTBNs defined in this thesis, 
the authors use the same acronym)2. Unlike DTBNs, the time line in CTBNs is divided 
into infinite number of intervals, which means that each interval is a time point. The state 
of a node locating in a time point represents that the failure event of the node occurs in 
this point. Unfortunately, there is no general-distribution BN inference engine for CTBNs 
so that the authors derive a closed-from solution for it. The authors also demonstrate how 
to map DFT gates into CTBNs. The limitation of CTBNs and DTBNs is that they are 
only applied to non-reparable systems; they are not capable to model reparable systems. 
The other extension of BNs to cope with system dynamic behaviors is the instance-based 
Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs) (Weber and Jouffe 2003; Montani, Portinale et al. 
2005; Portinale, Raiteri et al. 2010). In DBNs, the time is divided into successive time 
slices, and a node is associated with each time slice. The BN model is obtained by 
generating a BN for a specific time slice and repeating the same structure for all other 
slices, thus covering the whole time range of interest. Weber (Weber and Jouffe 2003) 
describes a study which is dedicated to show how to use DBNs to account for 
dependencies among components in reliability analysis. He also compares the 
performance of MCs with DBNs in reliability modeling. In the paper (Montani, Portinale 
et al. 2005), Montani proposes to characterize dynamic gates within the DBN framework, 
by translating DFTs into the corresponding DBN model.  
                                                           
2
 From the next paragraph of this paper, the acronym CTBN refers to the definition of Continuous Time Bayesian 
Network framework from Nodelman, U. (2007). Continuous Time Bayesian Networks. PhD Dissertation, STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY. 
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RAM Modeling Methods for Repairable Systems 
In all studies mentioned above, non-reparable systems are considered. In order to 
account for reparable systems, some extensions of Fault Trees are presented. In the paper 
(Bobbio and Raiteri 2004), the authors propose the Dynamic Repairable Parametric Fault 
Trees (DRPFTs), which implement DFTs in compact parametric form. By adding Repair 
Boxes (RB), the DFT is extended to include dependencies arising from the repair process. 
However, the RB semantics is investigated only in the special case of its application to a 
dynamic gate. In the work(Raiteri, Fraceschinis et al. 2004), another extension of FTs 
called Repairable Fault Trees (RFTs) is proposed; more generalized repair features are 
introduced. Nevertheless, one limitation is that, both methods have to be solved by Petri-
net-based method eventually, and the RB introduced by DRPFTs/RFTs requires a 
solution in the state spaces, which may be computationally very expensive. Thus in paper 
(Raiteri, Fraceschinis et al. 2004), the authors seek for solutions by implementing the 
modular multi-solution process. Namely classifying the RFT modules into two categories, 
the sub-trees without RB actions are solved with the standard combinatorial method and 
the sub-trees with RB actions are solved by Petri-net-based method. In spite of the 
increased expressive power, RFTs feature the drawback of a lower solving efficiency, 
due to the required state-based analysis. In the paper (Portinale, Raiteri et al. 2010), 
Portinale shows how to take into account similar repair policies aforementioned during 
the reliability analysis based on DBNs formalism. However, due to the limitation of 
DBNs, all repair policies investigated in this paper assume unlimited repair crews, which 
limit its application in real world.  
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In order to model repair actions with limited crews, one must have a center 
process which can assign and reclaim repair crews. The time-slice-based modeling 
method DBNs are out of capability for this situation. Continuous Time Bayesian 
Networks (CTBNs), firstly presented by Nodelman  (Nodelman 2007), are based on 
Bayesian Networks, but with a continuous time representation of the temporal evolution. 
They inherit all the advantages of BNs and are kind of event-based modeling methods, 
which are more flexible to model repair process under different repair policies. The 
technical report (Portinale and C. 2009) is the only work found to apply CTBNs in 
reliability modeling. In the technical report, the authors present an extension to CTBNs 
called Generalized CTBNs (GCTBNs) by adding immediate nodes. They claim that these 
immediate nodes allow capturing the logical/probabilistic interaction among the model’s 
variables.  Actually, in this thesis (Section 3.2.2, Chapter 3), we will demonstrate it is 
also possible to model this scenario just using the original definition of CTBNs. The 
authors also outline a semantic model of GCTBN based on the formalism of Generalized 
Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN). In this study, we propose a CTBN framework for 
reliability modeling, and extend it to an RAM modeling with considering various repair 
policies, including the repair policy with limited repair crews. We validate the proposed 
approach by applying it to an example taken from literature and show that the modeling 
capability of CTBNs outperforms that of DBNs, which indicates the CTBN framework is 
a good alternative for RAM modeling and analysis. 
2.3 System Design Optimization: Literature Review 
The design process of a reliable system is by nature, iterative. Traditional 
approaches to the design process of a reliable system follow the system requirement 
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analysis, preliminary design, detail design, evaluation and redesign phases until a final 
acceptable design is obtained. However, to achieve a shorter time-to-market, system 
reliability concerns should be addressed at the design stage (“design for reliability”). The 
design requirements have to consider reliability (availability), cost, weight, physical size, 
power consumption, etc. The system design optimization problem can be formula as to 
select components or redundancy-level to optimize some objective functions, given 
system-level constraints on reliability (availability), cost, and/or weight.  
The system design optimization problem consists of two parts: the system metrics 
estimation and the optimization methods. The common system metrics are system 
reliability (availability), cost and weight et al. The optimization methods in system design 
optimization problem refer to multi-objective optimization methods or single-objective 
optimization methods. In this study, we focus on multi-objective optimization methods.  
Among these system metrics, reliability (availability) estimation is the most 
important system metric. For different systems, the way to calculate reliability 
(availability) is total different. For example, in a simple series or parallel system, the 
reliability (availability) can be estimated by close-form mathematical formulas; however, 
for a complex system with dynamic behaviors or various kind of repair policies, there are 
not close-form mathematical formulas for its reliability (availability), the Markov chain, 
Dynamic Bayesian Networks or CTBNs are the methods for the reliability (availability) 
estimation in this kind of systems. From optimization standpoint, we put this kind of non-
close-form objective function problem as black-box optimization problem. The heuristics 
methods (GA, Simulated annealing and Tabu search et. al) are the most efficiency way to 
solve the black-box optimization problem.  
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Thus, in the proposed system design optimization framework, we treat the system 
design optimization problem based on the difference of systems. For simple structure 
(series/parallel) systems with close-form reliability (availability) mathematical formulas, 
we propose a modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method to identify all Pareto-optimal 
solutions. For systems with dynamic behaviors and various repair policies, we employ 
CTBNs to estimate its reliability (availability) and treat it as a black-box optimization 
problem; and NSGA-II is used to solve for its Pareto solutions.  
2.3.1 System Metrics Estimation Methods 
A large number of models and solution methods have been proposed to solve the 
system design optimization problem especially the reliability optimization problem 
(Redundancy Allocation Problem, RAP), such as dynamic programming, Lagrangean 
multiplier (Misra 1972), heuristic approach (Ramirez-Marquez and Coit 2004) and 
integer programming (Sharma and Misra 1990). As for the system involves active and 
cold-standby redundancy, Tavakkoli-Moghaddam (Tavakkoi-Moghaddam, Safari et al. 
2008) proposed a genetic algorithm for a redundancy allocation problem of the Series-
Parallel system with active and cold-standby redundancies. The similar jobs are done by 
Coit in these papers (Coit and Smith 1996; Coit 2001). However, the above-mentioned 
methodologies are not applicable to the kind of complex system with dynamic behaviors; 
they mainly focus on simple system structure: series, parallel or k-out-of-n with/without 
simple active or cold-standby redundancy strategy. The reliability of these simple 
structure (series/parallel) systems can be estimated by close-form mathematical formulas. 
There are few works about reliability (availability) optimization of complicated systems 
with dynamic behaviors. The only one work related to this is done by Ren (Ren and 
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Dugan 1998). In her paper, she described a methodology for embedding a GA into an 
existing fault-tree methodology to determine the heuristic optimal design configuration of 
a reliable system. She used DFTs to model interactive actions between events. However, 
she applied MCs-based method DIFtree SOLVER to solve the DFTs, which will have 
state explosion problem if the system is too large.  As we discussed in previous 
subsection, the CTBN is a flexible tool for reliability (availability) estimation. It doesn’t 
have the state explosion problem mentioned above, but it is more practical to model the 
dynamic failure behaviors between components and various repair policies. In this study, 
we will employ CTBNs to calculate system reliability (availability) of complex systems 
with dynamic behaviors for the proposed system design optimization framework. 
2.3.2 Optimization Methods 
           In the past several decades, there have been a number of studies and approaches to 
the RAP. Roughly, they can be grouped into three categories: single objective 
optimization with constraints, aggregated objective function methods for multi-objective 
optimization, and Pareto-based ranking methods for multi-objective optimization. 
Single objective optimization methods 
The first set of methods treat the RAP as a single objective optimization problem 
(maximizing system reliability or minimizing cost) with constraints. Various single-
objective optimization approaches have been used to solve such formulations, including 
dynamic programing (Bellman and Dreyfus 1958; Fyffe, Hines et al. 1968; Misra 1971), 
integer programming (Bulfin and Liu 1985; Misra and Sharma 1991; Billionnet 2008), 
meta-heuristics (Painton and Campbell 1995; Coit and Smith 1996; Ravi, Murty et al. 
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1997; Kulturel-Konak, Smith et al. 2003; Liang and Smith 2004; Rashika and Manju 
2006), mixed integer and non-linear programming (Tillman, Hwang et al. 1977) and 
column generation method (Zia and Coit 2010).  
Multi-objective Optimization: Aggregation Objective Function Methods  
These single-objective optimization techniques have their own advantages on 
RAP. However, in practical applications, some researchers have realized that it should 
take multiple considerations into account when determining the redundancy allocation of 
the system. For example, they want to obtain a system with high reliability and at the 
same time, they still want the design cost of the system to be low. The aggregation 
objective function method is implemented to solve this problem. They weight sum the 
multiple objective functions into a single objective function, and solve the new objective 
function via single-objective optimization approaches. These studies (Dhingra 1992; 
Busacca, Marseguerra et al. 2001; Marseguerra, Zio et al. 2004; Zafiropoulos and 
Dialynas 2004; Tian and Zuo 2006) are belong to this category. In the paper (Dhingra 
1992), the author presented a multi-objective reliability apportionment problem. The 
problem is a multi-objective, nonlinear, mixed-integer mathematical programming 
problem and is solved by sequential unconstrained minimization techniques in 
conjunction with heuristic algorithms. The series system considered in this study is with 
time-dependent reliability. The study (Zafiropoulos and Dialynas 2004) provided an 
efficient computational method to obtain the optimal system structure of electronic 
devices by using a single or a multi-objective simulated annealing algorithm based 
optimization approach. Studies (Marseguerra, Zio et al. 2004; Zafiropoulos and Dialynas 
2004; Tian and Zuo 2006) are multi-criteria formulations using genetic algorithm. 
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Approach in paper (Tian and Zuo 2006) is based on GA and Monte Carlo simulation; 
while in paper (Marseguerra, Zio et al. 2004) GA and physical programming are 
combined to solve the RAP.   
Multi-objective Optimization: Pareto-based ranking methods 
The above multiple objectives studies have taken important steps towards finding 
more effective and efficient approaches for RAP. However, in order to obtain promising 
results, how to aggregate multiple objectives into a single one is a sophisticated work; 
besides, the aggregation of multiple objectives may eliminate the possibility of 
identifying more non-dominated solutions. To cope with these drawbacks, people come 
to some other multi-objective optimization approaches. Multi-objective optimization 
refers to the solution of problems with two or more objective to be satisfied 
simultaneously. Unlike single-objective optimization problem, the multi-objective 
optimization problems usually have a set of solutions, which called Pareto-optimal 
solutions or non-dominated solutions. There have been some studies in this field (Salazar, 
Rocco et al. 2006; Taboada, Baheranwala et al. 2007; Kulturel-Konak, Coit et al. 2008; 
Taboada, Espiritu et al. 2008). In the paper (Taboada, Baheranwala et al. 2007), the 
authors formulated the redundancy allocation problem as a tri-objective problem 
(maximize reliability, minimize cost and weight) and solve this problem using Non-
dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA-II) (Deb, Pratap et al. 2002). An 
improving version NSGA-II was presented so called MOMS-GA (Taboada, Espiritu et al. 
2008) to solve the tri-objective redundancy allocation problem in multi-state systems. In 
the paper (Kulturel-Konak, Coit et al. 2008), Tabu search approaches with Monte-Carlo 
simulation method are employed to solve a bi-objective (reliability and cost) redundancy 
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allocation problem. In this paper (Kulturel-Konak, Coit et al. 2008), a problem specific 
MOEA is employed to solve the continuous reliability optimization problems where the 
reliability of the components are variables to be optimized.  
The meta-heuristic based multi-objective optimization approaches mentioned 
above are very popular on RAP now. However, meta-heuristic based approaches have 
several limitations: they do not guarantee that Pareto points are optimal; they may not 
identify all the Pareto-optimal points and they may have computation burden problem 
when the population size is large. Thus, in this study, from optimization standpoint, in 
our proposed system design optimization framework, two cases are discussed. 1) For 
systems with dynamic behavior and various repair policies, CTBNs is used to estimate 
the system reliability (availability). The system design optimization is a black-box type 
problem and the meta-heuristic based methods are best option for this kind of problem. 
Thus in our framework, NSGA-II is employed to identify the Pareto solutions for this 
problem.  2) For simple structure (series/parallel) systems with close-form reliability 
(availability) mathematical formulas, a modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method is 
proposed to identify all Pareto-optimal solutions for this problem. Compared with meta-
heuristic based method NSGA-II, the modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method could 
identify all Pareto-optimal solutions, and guarantees that the identified solutions are 
Pareto-optimal.  
The %-constraint method (Chankong and Haimes 1983)  is a traditional method to 
generate all non-dominated solutions for multi-objective optimization problems. It works 
by choosing one of the objective functions as the only objective and handling the 
remaining objective functions in the form of constraints. Through systematic variation of 
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the objective constraint bounds, all non-dominated solutions can be obtained. To improve 
the computational efficiency of the %-constraint method, an improved version of the %-
constraint method (Ozlen and Azizoglu 2009)  was proposed. Instead of using a fixed	%, 
the improved method updates the % value based on the location of the previous solution. 
It uses an adaptive % value in each iteration, which explains its name, the adaptive %-
constraint method. This improves the efficiency of algorithm significantly. However, 
there are two limitations ton this method. Firstly, the adaptive %-constraint method is 
limited to linear objective functions and requires all coefficients of the objective function 
terms and the decision variables to be integers. Secondly, this method identifies duplicate 
solutions, affecting the efficiency of the algorithm. In this thesis, we propose efficient 
solutions for addressing these two limitations. 
In the RAP problems, the system reliability objective function is not a linear 
integer function. In order to obtain a linear function, we make some mathematical 
transformations to the reliability objective function. In addition, to cope with the non-
integral nature of the non-integer reliability objective function, we make necessary 
modifications to the adaptive ϵ-constraint method so that it can account for at least one 
non-integer linear objection function. To avoid solving for the duplicated solutions, two 
search refinement strategies are added to the adaptive ϵ-constraint method which can help 
to reduce the number of IPs solving solved significantly. Furthermore, a decomposition 
scheme is employed to improve the algorithm efficiency. We decompose the original 
problem into several sub-problems and solve each sub-problem for Pareto-optimal 
solution sets with the modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method. By sequentially combining 
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and filtering each pair of Pareto-optimal solution sets from a pair of subsystems, finally 
we can obtain the Pareto-optimal solutions set for the original problem.  
2.4 Summary 
We first introduce the concepts, definitions and assumptions of repairable systems. 
Then we review the different quantitative RAM analysis methods being used currently 
and present the relevant research on system design optimization methods. Furthermore, 
the limitations of existing methods are highlighted and discussed.   
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Chapter 3 RAM Modeling using Continuous Time Bayesian Networks 
 
As we discuss in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, in RAM modeling, the existing 
methods have limitations. Such as the traditional method Markov chains have state 
explosion problem when the system is too larger; while the Dynamic Bayesian Networks 
are incapable to model some repair policies especially the one with limited repair crews. 
The CTBNs, firstly presented by Nodelman (Nodelman 2007), are based on Bayesian 
Networks, but with a continuous time representation of the temporal evolution. They 
inherit all the advantages of BNs and are kind of event-based modeling methods which 
are more flexible to model repair process under different repair policies. In this chapter, 
we propose CTBN formalism for RAM modeling. The proposed method doesn’t have the 
state explosion problem. And within the flexible modeling ability, it is capable to cope 
with various repair policies.  The proposed approach is applied to three case examples, 
one is taken from the literature and another two are original from practical problems of 
our industrial partners. The experiment results are promising, which indicate that the 
presented method is a good alternative for existing RAM modeling methods. 
3.1 Introduction of CTBNs 
In this subsection, we provide the background material about the Continuous 
Time Bayesian Networks. We first introduce a continuous-time, finite-state, homogenous 
Markov process, and then describe the Continuous Time Bayesian Networks, which use a 
graphical representation to model multi-variable continuous-time stochastic process. 
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3.1.1 Continuous Time Markov Processes 
Let &  be a continuous-time, finite-state, homogenous Markov process. &  has ' 
states {)*, )+, … , )-}. &() is the (finite) state of the system at time . The collection of 
random variables {&()| ∈ 	1}  composes the process. &  satisfies the Markov 
assumptions.  
The initial distribution 23 = 2()(0)) is a multinomial distribution over ' states 
of & . The transient behavior of &  is described by the initial distribution 23  and the 
transition model which is often represented by the intensity matrix 
45 = 6
−75* 75859 ⋯ 7585;75958 −75+ … 7595;⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮75;58 75;59 … −75-> 
where 75?5@is the intensity with which &transitions from )Ato )Band 75A = ∑ 75?5@ADB . The 
diagonal element 7A and the off-diagonal elements 7ABdefine the instantaneous transition 
probabilities of	&.  
The intensity matrix 45 is time invariant. Given	45, the transient behavior of & 
can be described as the following: &  stays in state )A  for an amount of time   and 
transitions to state)B.  is exponentially distributed with parameter 75A. The expected time 
of transitioning is	1/75. Upon transitioning, the probability that & transitions from state 
)A to )B is	G5?5@ = 75?5@/75? . For example, assume that we want to model the changes of 
weatherH()  which has three values 	(IJKLH()M = {N = O
''P, N* = QJR'P,N+ =
SKT
P}). We could represent the behavior of H() using the intensity matrix 
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QV = W−1.6 1.3 . 3. 7 −1 . 3. 8 1.2 −2^ 
If we set the time unit to one day, this means that we expect the weather would change in 
*+ = .5 day if currently it is cloudy. When the intensity is changing, with probability 
.+` = .4 the new value will be sunny and with probability *.++ = .6 the new value will be 
rainy.  
To model a multi-variable system, we first combine all variables into a single join 
variable by enumerating all possible states of the variables. If the system has N 
variables	&A(R = 1, … ,b), and each variable contain cA states, the total number of states 
of the join process is ' = ∏ cAeAf*  and the size of the intensity matrix for the join process 
is ' by '. As the number of variables increases, the size of the intensity matrix grows 
exponentially.  
3.1.2 Continuous Time Bayesian Networks 
A continuous-time Markov process suffers from state space explosion when 
handling large dynamic systems. A structured representation is needed to deal with multi-
variable dynamic systems.  
In order to decompose a multi-variable dynamic system, we introduce a 
conditional intensity matrix (CIM) to describe the dynamics of local variables in a system. 
Let & be all the variables of the dynamic system we are trying to model. Let ) ∈ & be one 
variable in the system and g ⊂ & be a set of other variables. The conditional intensity 
matrix 45|i  for variable ) is defined as a set of intensity matrices	45|! , one for each 
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instantiation 
	of the variable set	g. The evolution of &	depends instantaneously on the 
values of the variables in	g . Using a CIM, we can model each local variable as an 
inhomogeneous Markov process, whose intensities are a function of the current values of 
a set of other variables 
Example 3.1.2.1 Let us expand the weather example in the previous subsection to a 
dynamic system with more than one node. Assume that we want to consider the effect of 
the weather on the people’s outdoor exercise intensity, which has two 
values	(IJKLj()M = {k = KRlℎ, k* = 'TQJK}). We can model the dynamics of each 
local variable separately by utilizing the dependencies among the variables. Therefore, 
the dynamics of the exercise intensity can be described using three CIMs. 
4n|op = q−.1 . 1. 8 −.8r 		4n|o8 = q−.4 . 41.2 −1.2r, 
		4n|o9 = q−.3 . 31 −1r 
The behavior of variable j() is now represented as an inhomogeneous Markov 
process, whose intensities depend on the current value of	H(). When	H() = N, the 
behavior of j() is descried using	4n|op . When	H() = N*, it is described using	4n|o8 . 
When	H() = N+, it is described using	4n|o9 .  
The way the Markov chain models the dynamic of this system is total different. 
We first have to list all the possible combinations of the joint 
variable: {(N, k), (N, k*), (N*, k), (N*, k*), (N+, k), (N+, k*)} . We then write the 
transition intensity of each pair of values into the join intensity matrix. It is a 6 by 6 
matrix. 
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Definition 3.1.2.1 A continuous time Bayesian Networks b  over &  consists of two 
components: an initial distribution	23, specified as a Bayesian Networks s over	&, and a 
continuous transition model, specified using a directed (possibly cyclic) graph t whose 
nodes are	) ∈ &. Let g5 denote the parents of ) in	t. Each variable ) ∈ & is associated 
with a conditional intensity matrix	45|iu .  
Example 3.1.2.2 Assume we want to model how a person improves his health status via 
doing outdoor exercise. When the weather is good, or his schedule is not tight, he may 
exercise more. Increasing exercise intensity tends to make him more energetic and 
healthy, which will allow him to work more efficiently. Such a dynamic system contains 
four variables: Weather, Exercise, Schedule, and Body status. Each variable changes in 
continuous time and its changing rate depends on the current value of some other 
variables.  
We can use a CTBN to represent such behavior. The dependencies of these four 
variables are depicted using a graphical structure. As shown in Figure 3.1. The 
quantitative transient dynamics for each variable are represented using CIMs. Let’s 
assume all the four variables are binary. Let B(t)  be the person’s body 
status 	(IJKLs()M = {x = ℎkJKℎ, x* = ORSy}) , E(t)  be the exercise 
intensity (IJKLj()M = {k = KRlℎ, k* = 'TQJK}) , S(t)  be his daily 
schedule (IJKLc()M = {O = KTTOk, O* = Rlℎ}) , and H()  be the 
weather (IJKLH()M = {N = O
''P,N* = QJR'R'l}) . The conditional intensity 
matrices for the four variables can be specified as 
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Table 3.1: CIM for node Weather  
State H(N) H(N*) H(N) -.5 .5 H(N*) .5 -.5 
 
Table 3.2: CIM for node Exercise  {H(N), c(O)} State j(k) j(k*)  {H(N*), c(O)} State j(k) j(k*) j(k) -2 2 j(k) -.6 .6 j(k*) .1 -.1 j(k*) .3 -.3 {H(N), c(O*)} State j(k) j(k*) {H(N*), c(O*)} State j(k) j(k*) j(k) -.5 .5 j(k) -1 1 j(k*) 1.1 -1.1 j(k*) .1 -.1 
 
Table 3.3: CIM for node Schedule  s(x) State c(O) c(O*)  s(x*) State c(O) c(O*) c(O) -.1 .1 c(O) -.5 .5 c(O*) .5 -.5 c(O*) .8 -.8 
 
Table 3.4: CIM for node Body status  j(k) State s(x) s(x*)  j(k*) State s(x) s(x*) s(x) -.2 .2 s(x) -.1 .1 s(x*) 5 -5 s(x*) 10 -10 
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Figure 3.1: Healthy improvement example 
If the person is in loose schedule, and the weather is sunny, the dynamic of his 
exercise intensity is determined by the intensity matrix	4n|o|,,}p,. If the time unit is one 
month, we can expect he will do normal exercise in *+ = .5 month, conditioned on the fact 
that he is currently doing light exercise, his schedule is loose and the weather is good. 
The model contains double direction links, the dash line, indicating that whether a person 
is doing normal exercise depends on his body status; while the body status also impacts 
the exercise intensity of the person. For example, if he is sick, we would not do any 
exercise.   
3.1.3 Inference in CTBNs 
Given a CTBN model, we would like to use it to answer queries conditioned on 
observations, which is named evidence here. Evidence for a CTBN is usually a partial 
trajectory, in which some values or transitions are missing for some variable during some 
time intervals. It is also possible that the evidence has no observation; we name it as 
empty evidence. In this study, we mainly focus on two kinds of queries. The first one is 
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to query the marginal distribution of some variable at a particular time, such as the 
distribution of weight at	 = 10, which can answer the kind of question like what is the 
probability of the person is overweight at the tenth month. In reliability analysis, this 
inference enables us to query the reliability or point availability of a system at a particular 
time. The second kind of inference is to query the expected total amount of time that a 
variable spends in a state in a period of time like	[0	]. For example, this inference can 
answer the question like what is the expected total month the person is overweight for the 
first ten months. In reliability analysis, we can apply this to calculate the expected total 
amount of operational time for a repairable system so as to estimate its mean availability. 
The reliability or availability estimation using a CTBN is a filtering task with empty 
evidence for a particular node. 
Inference algorithms 
There are various inference algorithms available in the literature, such as the exact 
inference method (Nodelman, Koller et al. 2005), the expectation propagation based 
method (Nodelman, Koller et al. 2005; Saria, Nodelman et al. 2007), the mean field 
variational based method (Cohn, El-Hay et al. 2009) and the sampling based method (Fan 
and Shelton 2008). Next, we will give a brief introduction of the basic inference 
algorithm in CTBNs, the exact inference. A more complete treatment of this method can 
be found in Nodelman’ paper (Nodelman, Koller et al. 2005). 
Assume that there is a partially observed trajectory ~ for a CTBN from time 0 
to	. The evidence ~ is divided into b interval [A, A1*)(R = 0,… ,b − 1) according to 
the observed transition times. That is, each interval contains a constant observation of the 
CTBN. We set  = 0 and	e = .  
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To perform exact inference, the intensity matrix 4  for the join homogeneous 
Markov process is generated using the amalgamation method. Then the evidence is 
incorporated into 4 as following. The intensity matrix 4 is reduced to 4A for each interval 
[A, A1*)  by zeroing out the rows and columns of 4  which represent states that are 
inconsistent with the evidence. And 4AB represents the matrix 4 with all elements zeroed 
out except the off-diagonal elements that represent the intensities of transitioning from 
non-zero rows in 4A  to non-zero columns in4B . Exp	(4A(A1* − A))  is the transition 
matrix for interval [A, A1*)  and 4A,A1*coresponds to the transition probability density 
between two consecutive intervals at time A1*.  
Next, the forward-backward algorithm for Markov processes is used to answer 
queries. Let  = (&, ~[,])  and  = (~[,)|&)  be the forward and backward 
probability vector respectively, ~[?,@] be the trajectory during interval[A, B],  be the 
initial distribution 23 over the state at time 0 and  be a vector of ones. The forward and 
backward distribution vectors for each interval can be calculated recursively: 
?8 = A expL4A(A1* − A)M4A,A1* 
A = 4A*,A expL4A(A1* − A)M ?8 
The distribution over the state of the CTBN at time  ∈ [A, A1*) given the evidence ~[,) 
can be computed as  
2L& = , ~[,)M = A expL4A( − A)M ∆, expL4A(A1* − )M ?8  
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where  ∆A,B  is an ' × '  matrix of zeros except for a single one in position R,  . The 
expected total amount of time that the join Markov process spends in state   during 
interval [A , A1*) given the evidence is a kind of expected sufficient statistics (Nodelman, 
Koller et al. 2005)  for CTBNs, which can be calculated as: 
1  ? expL4A( − A)M ∆B,B expL4A(A1* − )M ?8?8?  
where  is the normalization factor to guarantee that the summation of the total time the 
process spends on each state during interval [A, A1*) is A1* − A.  
3.2 FT(DFT) Gates and CTBN Modeling 
Fault trees (FTs) are one of the most popular techniques for reliability analysis of 
large, complex systems. The two most commonly used gates in a FT are the AND gate 
and OR gate. Dynamic Fault trees are extensions of FTs, aimed at increasing the 
modeling power of FTs by including new primitive gates, able to accommodate complex 
kind of dependencies. DFTs introduce four basic (dynamic) gates: the warm spare gate 
(WSP), the sequence enforcing gate (SEQ), the probabilistic dependency gate (PEDP) 
and the priority AND gate (PAND). In the rest of this section, we propose to characterize 
(Dynamic) Fault trees gates within the CTBNs framework, by translating all the basic 
gates into the corresponding CTBNs models. We adopt the following convention. Given 
a generic binary component  we denote with  = 1 the component failure and with 
 = 0	 the component working. In the common hypothesis, component failures and 
repairs are exponentially distributed with failure rate	 and	. 
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3.2.1 AND Gate and OR Gate 
The AND gate represents that the output event occurs if all input events occur; the 
OR gate represents that the output event occurs if at least one of the input events occurs. 
The corresponding CTBN representations for AND gate and OR gate are shown in Figure 
3.2. In the CTBN modeling, node A, B and C all have 2 states: state 1 means the 
corresponding component fails and state 0 means it is working. Their initial states are 0, 
which means that they are all working at the beginning. CIMs for node A and B are listed 
in the left part of Table 3.5. For node A/B, its initial state is 0, the expected time of 
transitioning from state 0 to state 1 is	 * or *. However, when it enters state 1, it will stay 
in that state forever, because the expected time of transitioning from state 1 to state 0 is 
infinity (1/0). In reliability, this means that the component is non-repairable. This is very 
easy to be extended to model reparable case. For instance, suppose component A and B 
both are reparable and subject to a CR policy with failure rate and repair rate  and	 
respectively. When they are in state 1, they will return back to state 0 with expected time 
*  and		 * respectively. The detailed CIM for the reparable case is in the right part of 
Table 3.5. For node C with OR gate, its initial state is 0. When node A and B are in state 
0, node C always stays in state 0 (the expected transitioning time is infinity). However, 
when at least one of A or B is in state 1, it transits into state 1 immediately (the expected 
transitioning time is	0 = *).  The similar logic is applied to node C with AND gate.  
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Table 3.5: : CIMS for node A and B of  OR gate 
Node A,  
non-
reparable 
State A(0) A(1)  Node A,  
reparable 
State A(0) A(1) 
A(0) −  A(0) −  
A(1) 0 0 A(1)  − 
Node B,  
non-
reparable 
State B(0) B(1) Node B,  
reparable 
State B(0) B(1) 
B(0) −  B(0) −  
B(1) 0 0 B(1)  − 
 
Table 3.6: CIMS for node C of OR gate 
{A(0),B(0)} 
 
State B(0) B(1) 
B(0) 0 0 
B(1) ∞ −∞ 
{A(0),B(1)} 
{A(1),B(0)} 
{A(1),B(1)} 
State B(0) B(1) 
B(0) −∞ ∞ 
B(1) 0 0 
 
Table 3.7: CIMS for node C of AND gate 
{A(0),B(0)} 
{A(0),B(1)} 
{A(1),B(0)} 
State B(0) B(1) 
B(0) 0 0 
B(1) ∞ −∞ 
{A(1),B(1)} State B(0) B(1) 
B(0) −∞ ∞ 
B(1) 0 0 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The OR and AND gate in FT and CTBN representation 
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3.2.2 WSP Gate 
The WSP is a dynamic gate modeling one or more main components that can be 
replaced by one or more backups (spares). Spares can fail while they are dormant, but the 
failure rate of the unpowered spare is αλ with 0≤α≤1 called the dormancy factor and λ is 
the failure rate of an active spare. Spares are called “hot” if α=1 and “cold” if α=0. When 
the main component fails, the switch will activate spare component to substitute the main 
one with probability	*; it fails to activate spare component with probability	+(+ = 1 −
*). As an example, let us consider a situation where a single component P can be 
substituted by a spare S. If any component (either main or spare) is failed or the switch 
fails to active spare component, the gate produces a fault. The corresponding CTBN 
nodes to this gate are shown in Figure 3.3. Node P has 3 states: 0, 11 and 12. State 0 
means P is working; State 11 means P fails in failure modal 1, which means that the 
switch activates the spare component successfully; State 12 means P fails in failure 
modal 2, which means that the switch fails to activate the spare component. Node S and 
Node WSP both have 2 states: 0 and 1. State 0 means it is working, while state 1 means it 
fails. The CIMs for each node with different scenarios are listed in Table 3.8-3.10. For 
node P, its initial state is 0, the expected time it goes out this state is	 *. The probability it 
enters state 11 is "8 = * and the probability it enters state 12 is	"9 = +. If it transits 
into state 11 or state 12, it will stay in that state forever. For node S, its initial state is 0. 
However, the state transition depends on its parent P. If P is in state 0, then S is dormant 
and evolves with failure rate	}; If P is in state 11, which means P fails and the switch 
activates S successfully, it will evolve with failure rate	} ; If P is in state 12, which 
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means P fails and the switch fails to activate S, then S will stay in dormant state. S is non-
reparable; once it enters the failure state, it will not go out. For node WSP, it will stay in 
state 0 if P is working or P is in state 11 and S is in state 0; it will transit into state 1 
immediately if P is in state 12 or P is in state 11 and S is in state 1. 
 
Figure 3.3: The WSP gate in FT and CTBN representation 
Table 3.8: CIM for node P of WSP gate 
State P(0) P(11) P(12) 
P(0) − * + 
P(11) 0 0 0 
P(12) 0 0 0 
 
Table 3.9: CIM for node S of  WSP gate 
P(0) 
 
 
State S(0) S(1) 
S(0) −} } 
S(1) 0 0 
P(11) State S(0) S(1) 
S(0) −} −} 
S(1) 0 0 
P(12) State S(0) S(1) 
S(0) −} } 
S(1) 0 0 
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Table 3.10: CIM for node WSP 
{P(0), S(0)} 
{P(0), S(1)} 
{P(11), S(0)} 
State WSP(0) WSP(21) 
WSP(0) 0 0 
WSP(21) ∞ −∞ 
{P(11), S(1)} 
{P(12), S(0)}  
{P(12), S(1)} 
State WSP(0) WSP(21) 
WSP(0) −∞ ∞ 
WSP(21) 0 0 
 
3.2.3 PAND Gate 
PAND gate reaches a failure state if and only if all of its input components have 
failed in a pre-assigned order. As an example, let us consider a situation where a PAND 
gate consists of 2 components A, B. If A fails before B, then a failure occurs; otherwise, 
there is not a failure happening. Node B has 3 states: state 0 means B is working; state 11 
means A fails before B; state 12 means A fails after B. Node A and node PAND have 2 
states 0 and 1. State 0 means they are working while state 1 means they fail. CIM of node 
A is the same as that in Table 3.5. CIM of node B and node PAND are listed in Table 
3.11 and Table 3.12 respectively. For node B, if A is in state 0, the only way B can go is 
to state 12, which means B fails before A. However, if A is in state 1, obviously, A fails 
before B, B then will enter state 11. As for node PAND, it will keep in state 0 unless A 
and B both are in state 1, which indicates a failure.  
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Figure 3.4: The PAND gate in FT and CTBN representation 
Table 3.11: CIM for node B of PAND gate 
A(0) State B(0) B(11) B(12) 
B(0) − 0  
B(11) 0 0 0 
B(12) 0 0 0 
A(1) State B(0) B(11) B(12) 
B(0) −  0 
B(11) 0 0 0 
B(12) 0 0 0 
 
Table 3.12: CIM for node PAND 
{A(1), 
B(11)} 
 
 
State PAND(0) PAND(1) 
PAND(0) −∞ ∞ 
PAND(1) 0 0 
Others 
 
 
State PAND(0) PAND(1) 
PAND(0) 0 0 
PAND(1) 0 0 
 
3.2.4 PDEP Gate 
In the PDEP gate, one trigger event T causes other dependent components to 
become unusable or inaccessible with probability 	" ≤ 1 . As an example, let us 
consider a situation where the failure of a trigger component T will cause both 
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component A and B to fail with probability 	" . The corresponding CTBN 
representation is shown in Fig 3.5. Node T has 3 states: 0, 11 and 12. State 0 means it is 
working; state 11 means it fails in failure modal 1 and this failure will cause both A and 
B fail; state 12 means it fails in failure modal 2 and this failure has no effect on A and B. 
Node A and B both have 2 states: 0 and 1. State 0 means it is working while state 1 
means it fails. For node T, its initial state is 0 and it will transit to state 11 with 
probability "  or transit to state 12 with probability	1 − " . For node A, if T is 
working or T’s failure has not impact on it (with probability	"), it will evolve with 
failure rate	; otherwise, it will transit to failure state (state 1) immediately. Node B has 
the same CIMs as Node A has. The discussion above assumes that A and B are non-
reparable. If A and B are reparable, since trigger event T can cause both A and B to fail, 
there are two cases in reality: case 1: they need repair action or case 2: they do not. Case 
1 means that if A and B fail (due to trigger event T or fail by themselves), it takes * or 
* to repair them. Case 2 is that if A and B fail due to T, they do not need repair action. 
They are in good condition; they stop working just because T is malfunction. Once T is 
back to normal, they will continue to operate. However, if their failures are not caused by 
T, they fail by themselves, they still need repair action. For example, suppose T is power 
supply, A and B are two generators. If power supply (T) is down, A and B are down. 
However, they do not need repair action because they are in good condition. Once the 
power supply continues, they will continue to work again. It is easy to model case 1: if A 
or B are in state 1, they will transit back to state 0 with repair rate 	or	. For case 2, 
where one more state is needed for A and B, they have 3 states: state 0 means they are 
working; state 11 means they fail in failure modal 1 and this failure is caused by T, they 
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do not need repair action in this failure; state 12 means they fail in failure modal 2 and 
this failure is caused by themselves, so this failure needs repair action. For detail CIMs, 
please refer to Table 3.14 and Table 3.15. In the Literature (Portinale, Raiteri et al. 2010), 
only case 1 is considered.  In order to make a comparison with the results from the 
literature, for the rest of this chapter, unless specified, we refer to case 1.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: The PEDP gate in FT and CTBN representation 
Table 3.13: CIM for node T of PDEP gate 
State T(0) T(11) T(12) 
T(0) - " ∗  (1 − ") ∗  
T(11) 0 0 0 
T(12) 0 0 0 
 
Table 3.14: CIM for node A of PDEP gate, non-reparable and reparable case 1 
Non-reparable  Reparable, Case 1 
T(0)  or  
T(12) 
State A(0) A(1) T(0)  or  
T(12) 
State A(0) A(1) 
A(0) −  A(0) −  
A(1) 0 0 A(1)  − 
T(11) 
 
 
State A(0) A(1) T(11) 
 
 
State A(0) A(1) 
A(0) -∞ ∞ A(0) -∞ ∞ 
A(1) 0 0 A(1)  − 
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Table 3.15: CIM for node A of PDEP gate, reparable case 2 
Reparable, Case 2 
T(0)   
 
State A(0) A(11) A(12) 
A(0) − 0  
A(11) ∞ -∞ 0 
A(12)  0 − 
T(11) 
 
 
State A(0) A(11) A(12) 
A(0) -∞ ∞ 0 
A(11) 0 0 0 
A(12) 0 0 0 
T(12) 
 
 
State A(0) A(11) A(12) 
A(0) − 0  
A(11) 0 0 0 
A(12)  0 − 
 
3.3 Multi-state Interaction and CTBN Modeling 
Multi-state interaction is similar to the WSP gate. The (Dynamic) Fault trees 
cannot model a multi-state system, thus there is not this kind of gate in DFTs.  The 
difference between multi-state interaction and the WSP gate is that, in multi-state 
interaction, we do not distinguish components by primary and standby. The purpose of 
multi-state interaction is not to increase the redundancy. Instead, it models the case in 
which the failure distribution of one component depends on the working state of other 
components. In this sense, it looks more like the PDEP gate. However, the PDEP gate is 
to model common failure factor, which means that the failure of one component will 
bring down one or more components. In multi-state interaction, the component doesn’t 
necessarily fail; it primarily focuses on how the degradation of one component will affect 
the others.  For example, consider a system that consists of two components A and B in 
series with exponential failure distribution. A has multi-state: good, moderate and failed. 
B is binary state: good and failed. The failure rate of B depends on the state of A.  If A is 
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in state good, the failure rate for B is	,; if A is in state moderate, the failure rate for B 
change to	,  . The failure rates for A are ,and ,   when it is in state good and 
moderate respectively.  
The CTBN representation for multi-state interaction is shown in Figure 3.6. The 
CIM for node B is listed in Table 3.16. 
Table 3.16: CIM for node B of Multi-state interactions 
A(good) 
 
 
State B(good) B(failed) 
B(good) −, , 
B(failed) 0 0 
A(moderate) 
 
 
State B(good) B(failed) 
B(good) −,  ,  
B(failed) 0 0 
A(failed) State B(good) B(failed) 
B(good) −,  ,  
B(failed) 0 0 
 
 
Figure 3.6: CTBN representation for multi-state interaction 
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3.4 CTBN Modeling of Repair Policies 
In this subsection, we will present the modeling of repair policies within CTBN 
formalism through the CPU subsystem of a running example named the Cardiac Assist 
System (CAS) (Boudali, Crouzen et al. 2007; Portinale, Raiteri et al. 2010) described in 
Section 3.6.1. The CPU subsystem consists of two different CPUs: a primary CPU P with 
failure rate   and a backup warm spare CPU B with failure rate   and dormancy 
factor	 = .5. Both CPU are functionally dependent on cross switch CS (failure rate	¡¢) 
and system supervision SS (failure rate	¢¢). The failure of either CS or SS will force the 
failure of both CPUs and so the failure of the CPU subsystem. The dependencies among 
these components are modeled by dynamic gates and are shown as a part of DFT for the 
whole system in Figure 3.10. P and B are the input events of a WSP gate; this means that 
P is the principal component and in the case of failure, it will be substituted by B. The 
PDEP gate forces both P and B to fail if the event Trigger occurs (failure of either CS or 
SS). The corresponding CTBN representation of this subsystem is show in Figure 3.10. 
3.4.1 CPU Subsystem with SGR Policy 
In the case when SGR policy is employed, the corresponding CTBN 
representation is show in Figure 3.7. Compared with non-reparable case, there are extra 
green links (dash line) from CPU to reparable components (CS, SS, P and B), which 
means that the failure of the CPU subsystem will activate the repair process of each 
component. Node CPU has 3 states (0, 1 and 2). State 0 means it is working; state 1 
means it is under repair and state 2 means the repair action is completed. The initial state 
of CPU is 0. When it fails, it enters state 1; the repair state and the node evolve following 
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the corresponding global repair rate	¢£¤  (the expected transition time from state 1 to 
state 2 is	 *¥¦§	). When the repair is done, it will enter state 2, which is an instant state 
indicating that the global repair action is done, and all components under repair (nodes 
with green in-flow link) are immediately set to be functional again; and CPU will switch 
to state 0 instantly. Table 3.17 is the detailed CIM for node CPU. For node P, if CPU is in 
state 2, the repair process is completed. If it is in state 1, it will return back to state 0 
immediately. Otherwise, it will stay in state 1. The detailed CIM is in Table 3.18. Other 
nodes (CS, SS and B) have the similar logic as node P.  
 
Figure 3.7: CTBN representation for SGR, SLR and SLR-min policy 
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Table 3.17: CIM for node CPU of CPU subsystem with SGR policy 
{P(0), B(0)}, 
{P(0), B(1)}, 
{P(1), B(0)} 
State CPU(0) CPU(1) CPU(2) 
CPU(0) 0 0 0 
CPU(1) ∞ −∞ 0 
CPU(2) ∞ 0 −∞ 
{P(1), B(1)} State CPU(0) CPU (1) CPU (2) 
CPU (0) −∞ ∞ 0 
CPU (1) 0 −¢£¤ ¢£¤ 
CPU (2) ∞ 0 −∞ 
 
Table 3.18: CIM for node P of CPU subsystem with SGR policy 
{Trigger (0),  
CPU (0)}, 
{Trigger (0),  
CPU (1)} 
State P(0) P(1)  {Trigger (1),  
CPU (0)}, 
{Trigger (1),  
CPU (1)} 
State P(0) P(1) 
P(0) −  P(0) −∞ ∞ 
P(1) 0 0 P(1) 0 0 
  
Trigger (0),  
CPU (2) 
State P(0) P(1)  Trigger (1),  
CPU (2) 
State P(0) P(1) 
P(0) −   P(0) −∞ ∞ 
P(1) ∞ −∞  P(1) ∞ −∞ 
 
3.4.2 CPU Subsystem with SLR Policy 
In the case when SLR policy is employed, the corresponding CTBN 
representation is the same as that of SGR shown in Figure 3.7. However, node CPU only 
has two states (0 it is working and1 it fails), the CIM is listed in Table 3.19. Nodes CS, 
SS, P and B all have 3 states (0, 1 and 2). State 0 means that the component is working; 
state 1 means that it fails and state 2 means it is being repaired. For node P, its repair 
process is activated by the failure of CPU. If CPU is in state 1 and P is in state 1, P will 
transits to state 2 immediately and evolves with repair rate	. The detailed CIM of P is 
listed in Table 3.20. Other nodes (CS, SS and B) have the similar logic as node P.  
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Table 3.19: CIM for CPU of CPU subsystem with SLR policy 
 
 
Table 3.20: CIM for P of CPU system with SLR policy 
Trigger (0),  
CPU (0) 
State P(0) P(1) P(2)  Trigger (1), 
 CPU (0) 
State P(0) P(1) P(2) 
P(0) −  0 P(0) −∞ ∞ 0 
P(1) 0 0 0 P(1) 0 0 0 
P(2)  0 − P(2)  0 − 
Trigger (0), 
CPU (1) 
State P(0) P(1) P(2) Trigger (1),  
CPU (1) 
State P(0) P(1) P(2) 
P(0) −  0 P(0) −∞ ∞ 0 
P(1) 0 −∞ ∞ P(1) 0 −∞ ∞ 
P(2)  0 − P(2)  0 − 
 
3.4.3 CPU Subsystem with SLR-min Policy 
In the case when SLR-min policy is employed, the corresponding CTBN 
representation is the same as that of SGR in Figure 3.7. The CIM of CPU is similar to 
that of SLR case, which is listed in Table 3.21. Node CS, SS, P and S all have 2 states (0 
and 1). State 0 means they are working, and state 1 means they fails or are been repaired. 
For node P, when CPU is in state 0 (CPU returned back to working state), if P is in state 1, 
it will stay in state 1 (with repair rate 0); this models the situation when the subsystem is 
functional, the repair action will stop. Other nodes (CS, SS and B) have the similar logic 
as node A. 
 
{P(0), B(0)} 
{P(0), B(1)} 
{P(1), B(0)} 
{P(0), B(2)} 
{P(2), B(0)} 
State CPU (0) CPU (1) 
CPU (0) 0 0 
CPU (1) ∞ −∞ 
{P(1), B(1)} 
{P(1), B(2)} 
{P(2), B(1)} 
{P(2), B(2)} 
State CPU (0) CPU (1) 
CPU (0) −∞ ∞ 
CPU (1) 0 0 
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Table 3.21: CIM for CPU of CPU subsystem with SLR-min policy 
{P(0), B(0)}, 
{P(1), B(0)}, 
{P(0), B(1)} 
State CPU (0) CPU (1) 
CPU(0) 0 0 
CPU (1) ∞ −∞ 
{P(1), B(1)} State CPU (0) CPU (1) 
CPU (0) −∞ ∞ 
CPU (1) 0 0 
 
Table 3.22: CIM for P of CPU subsystem with SLR-min policy 
{Trigger (0), CPU 
(0)} 
State P(0) P(1)  {Trigger (1), CPU 
(0)} 
State P(0) P(1) 
P(0) −  P(0) −∞ ∞ 
P(1) 0 0 P(1) 0 0 
{Trigger (0), CPU 
(1)} 
State P(0) P(1) {Trigger (1), CPU 
(1)} 
State P(0) P(1) 
P(0) −  P(0) −∞ ∞ 
P(1)  − P(1)  − 
 
3.4.4 CPU Subsystem with CR Policy 
When CR policy is applied to the CPU subsystem, there is no extra links and 
nodes needed. The corresponding CTBN representation is shown in Figure 3.8. The net 
representation is the same as the non-reparable case; however, CIM of each node is 
different from that of non-reparable case. Table 3.23 is the CIM for P with non-reparable 
case; Table 3.24 is the CIM for P with CR policy. Notice that the difference between 
them is when P is in state 1, it will stay there in non-reparable case, while it will evolve 
with repair rate 	in CR policy case. Other nodes (CS, SS and B) have the similar logic 
as node P. CIMs for node Trigger and node CPU are the same as that of non-reparable 
case.  
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Table 3.23: CIM for P of CPU subsystem with CR policy,  non-reparable case 
Trigger(0) State P(0) P(1) 
 P(0) −  
P(1) 0 0 
Trigger(1) State P(0) P(1) 
 P(0) −∞ ∞ 
P(1) 0 0 
 
Table 3.24: CIM for P of CPU subsystem with CR policy 
Trigger(0) State P(0) P(1) 
 P(0) −  
P(1)  − 
Trigger(1) State P(0) P(1) 
 P(0) −∞ ∞ 
P(1)  − 
CS SS
P
(PDEP)
B
(PDEP)
Trigger
(OR)
CPU
(WSP)
 
Figure 3.8: CTBN representation for CR policy 
3.4.5 CPU Subsystem with CR-limit Policy 
When CR-limit policy is applied, since the repair crews are limited, there should 
be a control center which can assign a repair crew to a down component, and reclaim the 
repair crew from a component when the repair process is completed. In the CPU 
51 
 
 
 
subsystem example, one more node M is added and plays this role. Node M has two way 
links connected with reparable components (CS, SS, P and B). If a component fails, and 
node M has available repair crew, it will assign this repair crew to this component; if 
there is not repair crew available, it will keep the component on hold. When a repair 
process is completed, the component will report to node M and node M will reclaim the 
repair crew from that component. The states of node M are dependent on the total number 
of repair crews available. Suppose there are ' repair crews available, then node M has 
	' + 1 states (0:	').  cJk = y	(y ≤ ')	means that there are y repair crews available. As 
an example, lets support	y = 2, then node M has 3 states: 0, 1 and 2. And the initial state 
is 2, which means it has 2 repair crews available at the beginning. Nodes CS, SS, P and B 
all have 3 states: 0, 1 and 2. State 0 means that the component is working; state 1 means 
that the component fails and state 2 means that it is being repaired.  The corresponding 
CTBN representation is shown in Figure 3.9. Table 3.25 is the CIM for node M with 2 
repair crews. Notice that the initial state of node M is state 2. When there is not a 
component in repair state (state 2), node M will stay in state 2. If one component fails, 
node M will transits into state 1 immediately and stay there (of course, this component 
will enter repair state 2). If the component finishes its repair process (back to state 0), 
node M will transits back to state 2 instantly. However, before the 1st failed component 
finishes it repair, if one more component fails, node M will transits from state 1 to state 0. 
At this time, even more components fail, node M will still stick in state 0, because there 
is not an available repair crew for assigning, and the failed components stay in a failure 
state (state 1) and wait for the repair crew. Table 3.26 is the CIM for node P. We can see 
that, when node M is in state 0, if P is in state 1, it will stay in state 1. However, if node 
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M is in state 1 or state 2, P will enter state 2 instantly, which mean that it is assigned a 
repair crew and can enter repair process. Other nodes (CS, SS and B) have the similar 
logic as node A.  
If we want to model this policy using Markov Chains, we can denote each state 
as	(c, cc, 2, s|	*, 	+);  	* and 	+ are the 1st and 2nd repair crew. The number of states 
we need for the case with 2 repair facilities is	2© × ©+ = 2© × ©×ª+ = 96. For the case 
with 3 or 4 repair facilities, the number of states need is	2© × ©ª = 2© × ©© = 192. Due 
to the natural limitation of DBNs, they cannot model this repair policy.  
 
Figure 3.9: CTBN representation for CR-limit policy 
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Table 3.25: CIM for node M of CPU subsystem with 2 repair facilities 
0 component (CS, SS, P, 
B) is in state 2 
State M(0) M(1) M(2) 
M(0) −∞ 0 ∞ 
M(1) 0 −∞ ∞ 
M(2) 0 0 0 
1 component (CS, SS, P, 
B) is in state 2 
State M(0) M(1) M(2) 
M(0) −∞ ∞ 0 
M(1) 0 0 0 
M(2)  ∞ −∞ 
2 or more than 2 
components (CS, SS, P, 
B) are in state 2 
State M(0) M(1) M(2) 
M(0) 0 0 0 
M(1) ∞ −∞ 0 
M(2) ∞ 0 −∞ 
 
Table 3.26: CIM for node P of CPU subsystem CR-limited policy 
{Trigger (0), 
M (0)} 
State P(0) P(1) P(2)  {Trigger (1), 
M (0)} 
State P(0) P(1) P(2) 
P(0) −  0 P(0) −∞ ∞ 0 
P(1) 0 0 0 P(1) 0 0 0 
P(2)  0 − P(2)  0 − 
{Trigger (0), 
M (1)}, 
{Trigger (0), 
M (2)} 
State P(0) P(1) P(2) {Trigger (1), 
M (1)}, 
{Trigger (1), 
M (2)} 
State P(0) P(1) P(2) 
P(0) −   P(0) −∞ ∞ 0 
P(1) 0 −∞ ∞ P(1) 0 −∞ ∞ 
P(2)  0 − P(2)  0 − 
 
3.5 Case Studies: 
In this subsection, the CTBN method is applied to three systems. The examples 
presented, are based on real-life systems. The Cardiac system is a typical example with 
dynamic behavior, which is broadly used in literatures (Boudali, Crouzen et al. 2007; 
Portinale, Raiteri et al. 2010) for evaluating the reliability modeling methods. The 
purpose of implementing the CTBN method to Cardiac system is two folders. First, we 
can show how to map the (Dynamic) Fault trees into CTBNs; second, we can evaluate the 
accuracy of CTBNs by comparing it with the results of other methods (Markov Chain, 
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Dynamic Bayesian Networks, Petri-net) taken from literatures (Montani, Portinale et al. 
2005; Portinale, Raiteri et al. 2010). The second example is a ground vehicle system, 
which is used for a demonstration of how the CTBNs model multi-state interactions. The 
last example is based on the second example. It is a fleet of vehicles system. The purpose 
of this example is to demonstrate how the CTBNs model the repairable system with 
limited shared repair crews, which cannot be modeled by Dynamic Bayesian Networks.  
3.5.1 Cardiac System 
The Cardiac Assist System (CAS) model is taken from literatures (Boudali, 
Crouzen et al. 2007; Portinale, Raiteri et al. 2010) and is based on a real-world system. It 
consists of three separate subsystems: the CPU subsystem, the motor subsystem and the 
pump subsystem. The failure of either one of the above subsystem will cause the whole 
system to fail. As we introduce in Section 3.5, the CPU subsystem has two different 
CPUs: a primary CPU P and a backup warm spare CPU B (with dormancy failure 
rate	 = 0.5	). Both CPUs are functionally dependent a cross switch CS and a system 
supervision SS. The failure of either CS or SS will force both CPUs to fail. The motor 
subsystem also has two motors: a primary MA and a cold spare MB. The switching 
component MS will activate the spare motor when the primary one fails on condition that 
MS is still working. This means that if MS fails before MA, MS cannot effetely turn on 
MB and then the whole subsystem fails. Finally, there are three pumps in the pump 
subsystem. Two primary pumps PA and PB running in parallel and a cold shared pump 
PS. The pump subsystem fails if all three pumps fail. The failure rate for each component 
is listed in Table 3.27 and the DFT for the whole CAS system is shown in Fig. 3.10. The 
CTBN representation corresponding to the DFT in Figure 3.10 is shown in Figure 3.11. 
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In this thesis, all numerical experiments with CTBNs are performed with CTBN-RLE 
(Shelton, Fan et al. 2010) developed by Shelton and his team.  And for all ∞ in CIMs, we 
make them equal to a larger number; here we choose	10*.   
Table 3.27: Failure rates for the CAS system component 
Component Subsystem  Failure rate 
Primary CPU-P CPU 	 = .5j − 3 
Backup CPU-B CPU  = .5E − 3 
Cross switch-CS CPU 	¡¢ = .2j − 3 
System supervision-SS CPU 	¢¢ = .2j − 3 
Primary Motor-MA MOTOR 	¬ = 1j − 3 
Cold spare Motor-MB MOTOR 	¬ = 1j − 3 
Switching Component- MS MOTOR 	¬¢ = .01j − 3 
Primary pump-PA PUMP 	 = 1j − 3 
Primary pump-PB PUMP 	 = 1j − 3 
Shared pump-PS PUMP 	¢ = 1j − 3 
 
In order to validate the correctness of CTBNs modeling method in RAM analysis, 
first, we consider the system as non-reparable and estimate the unreliability of the system 
with the mission time from 100 to 1000 hours (with time step 100), and then compare 
them with the results from paper (Montani, Portinale et al. 2005), which are calculated by 
MC-based method Galileo. Table 3.28 shows the comparison between them. Since 
Galileo method is based on continuous time Markov chain analysis, we consider the 
results obtained from it as true value. From the Table we can see that the results 
estimated from CTBNs are almost identical to those of Galileo, which validates the 
correctness of CTBN modeling method. The average of Relative Deviation Percentage 
(RDP) is as small as 2.3 %, where RDP is calculated 
by 		­2 = ∑ ®¯°±²³L´µ¶?M·¯°±²³(¦°±?±³p?)¯°±²³(¦°±?±³p?) ®;? - × 100 . The estimation of the reliability using 
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CTBNs is a filtering task which queries the node System (Top Event) with empty 
observation in in other nodes (Basic Event). 
Table 3.28: The unreliability of CAS estimated by CTBNs 
Hours CTBN Galileo Deviation RDP 
100 0.041633 0.046034 -0.0044 9.56% 
200 0.09786 0.103223 -0.00536 5.20% 
300 0.163169 0.169335 -0.00617 3.64% 
400 0.236178 0.24148 -0.0053 2.20% 
500 0.317489 0.31671 0.000779 0.25% 
600 0.391319 0.392059 -0.00074 0.19% 
700 0.469853 0.465402 0.004451 0.96% 
800 0.534843 0.534898 -5.5E-05 0.01% 
900 0.600071 0.59931 0.000761 0.13% 
1000 0.663378 0.657889 0.005489 0.83% 
 
Mean RDP 2.30% 
 
In the reparable case, in order to compare results of CTBN with those of other 
methods taken from the paper (Portinale, Raiteri et al. 2010), we assume the same setting 
as that in Portinale’s paper. Only the CPU subsystem is reparable: first only the two 
CPUs are applied with CR policy, and then extended to Trigger (CS and SS) with the 
same policy. Their repair rates are all equal to 0.1 (¡¢ = ¢¢ =  =  = .1). The 
DRPFTproc (Bobbio and Raiteri 2004)is a Stochastic Petri Nets based reliability analysis 
tool and the RADyBaN (Portinale, Raiteri et al. 2010)is a DBN-based method. Table 3.29 
shows the comparison of results obtained from these methods and CTBNs. From the 
Table we can see that the agreement between them. 
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Table 3.29: The unavailability (1- point availability) of CAS obtained by CTBNs with 
CR policy 
Hours 
CPU repair CPU+Trigger repair 
CTBN 
DRPFTproc 
(Bobbio and 
Raiteri 2004) 
RADyBaN 
(Portinale, 
Raiteri et al. 
2010) 
CTBN 
DRPFTproc 
(Bobbio and 
Raiteri 2004) 
RADyBaN 
(Portinale, 
Raiteri et al. 
2010 
100 0.04883 0.044330 0.044283 0.007782 0.011282 0.011243 
200 0.094698 0.095198 0.096916 0.025652 0.027652 0.027566 
300 0.160094 0.155094 0.156659 0.057963 0.054963 0.054837 
400 0.221637 0.220137 0.221550 0.088617 0.092117 0.091957 
500 0.291619 0.288119 0.2893821 0.136437 0.137437 0.137252 
600 0.356405 0.356905 0.358023 0.184482 0.188982 0.188779 
700 0.421624 0.424624 0.425606 0.248771 0.244771 0.244558 
800 0.490268 0.489768 0.490624 0.306446 0.302946 0.302729 
900 0.556211 0.551211 0.551952 0.360365 0.361865 0.36165 
1000 0.607691 0.608191 0.608829 0.421148 0.420148 0.419939 
  
Table 3.30: The unavailability (1- point availability) of CAS obtained by CTBNs with 
CR-limit policy 
 
Table 3.30 lists the unavailability estimated by CTBNs when the number of repair 
crew varies. The 2nd column (CR) is the unlimited repair crew case; the 3rd to 6th columns 
are the cases when number of repair crew varies from 4 to 1. The instantaneous 
availability decreases as the number of repair facility decreases. In this example, CR-L4 
Hours CR CR-limit 4 Crews 3 Crews 2 Crews 1 Crew 
100 0.04883 0.04935022 0.04987309 0.05495257 0.107054 
200 0.094698 0.09523264 0.09671853 0.09862899 0.16194 
300 0.160094 0.16017298 0.16141105 0.16729006 0.174128 
400 0.221637 0.22171244 0.22239923 0.22279578 0.294837 
500 0.291619 0.29245792 0.29389953 0.30237777 0.334138 
600 0.356405 0.35675185 0.35805307 0.3583714 0.3813 
700 0.421624 0.42220654 0.42272338 0.42998631 0.506544 
800 0.490268 0.49037719 0.49089903 0.49673556 0.54792 
900 0.556211 0.55698206 0.55789716 0.56496994 0.617032 
1000 0.607691 0.6081461 0.60920054 0.61310904 0.652559 
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should have the same result as that of CR because there are only 4 components in this 
subsystem. Having 4 repair crews available actually is the case of unlimited repair crews. 
Results (the 2nd and 3rd column) in the table above show the agreement between them. 
 
Figure 3.10: The DFT model of CAS 
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Figure 3.11: The CTBN representation corresponding to the DFT in Figure 3.10 
3.5.2 Ground Vehicle System 
Let’s look at a ground vehicle. It consists of four main subsystems in series: the 
body subsystem, the chassis subsystem, the powertrain subsystem and the electrical 
subsystem. Let’s focus more detail on the chassis subsystem and the powertrain 
subsystem. The chassis subsystem has four components in series: suspensions, the brakes, 
the wheels & tires, and the axles. The powertrain subsystem has three components in 
series: the engine, the transmission and the cooling subsystem. Although all components 
and subsystems are in series structure, there are some interactions among these 
components and subsystems. For example, the operating condition of suspension has a 
great impact on the wheels & tires, the body and the axles (Clifton 1990). With the 
suspension degradation, such as the shock absorber being stuck (less or no movement), 
the wheels & tires, the axles and the body would bear more energy from a shock and 
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would result in damages in these components, which will accelerate their failures. 
Another example of interaction is between the cooling subsystem and the engine (Walter 
2001). Commonly the perfect operating temperature for an engine is around 180F. The 
degradation of cooling system will lead to engine overheating or being too cold. One 
common effect of overheating or cooling to an engine is that the abnormal temperature 
will cause the engine lubricating oil to thin or become too dense and result in poor 
lubrication, which will cause damage to the engine and accelerate its failure. Thus, we 
assume that both the suspension and cooling system have multiple working states: good, 
moderate and failed. All other subsystems have binary states: working and failed. We 
also assume that all failure time and repair time follow exponential distribution. The 
failure rates . and repair rates .for each subsystem in different states are shown in Table 
3.31. The original failure rate for each subsystem is failures per mile. In order to make 
the unit consistent with repair rate (per hours), we transfer failure rate from failures per 
mile into failures per hour by using average speed factor 50 miles per hour. It is not easy 
to define the failure of a body subsystem, and this failure is not common except in car 
accidents. Thus in this study we don’t consider the failure of a body subsystem, and just 
put its failure rate and repair rate as 0. There are more than one suspension, wheel & tire 
in a vehicle, the failure rate and repair rate for these two subsystems are aggregated from 
independent multiple suspensions, wheels & tires. 
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Table 3.31: Failure and repair rate for each subsystem of ground vehicle example 
Subsystem Component State Failure Rate or Repair Rate 
Chassis (CH) 
Brakes(BR) 
 SU(good) SU(moderate) 
Good 
¸¹,= .5k − 3 ¸¹, = .8k − 3 
Failed  ¸¹ =.5 
Wheels & 
Tires(WT) 
 SU(good) SU(moderate) 
Good 
o,= .16k − 3 o, = .2k − 3 
Failed  .º» = 1.2 
Suspension(SU) 
Good }, = .5k − 4 
Moderate },  = .1k − 3 
Failed  }=3 
Axles(AX) 
 SU(good) SU(moderate) 
Good 
¼5,= .5k − 4 ¼5, = .7k − 4 
Failed  ¼5 =8 
Powertrain 
(PT) 
Engine(EG) 
 CO(good) CO(moderate) 
Good 
-,= .23k − 4 -, = .35k − 4 
Failed  - = 10 
Transmission(TR) Good ¹ = .83k − 4 
Failed  ¹ =4 
Cooling(CO) 
Good ½, =.75e-4 
Moderate ½,  =.15e-3 
Failed  ½ =3.5 
Electrical 
subsystem(EL) 
Electrical 
subsystem(EL) 
Good ¾ =.12e-3 
Failed  ¾ =.8 
Body (BO) Body (BO) Good ¸¿ =0 
Failed  ¸¿ =0 
 
The (Dynamic) Fault trees are only limited to modeling binary state systems. The 
CTBNs can easily handle a multi-state component. The CTBN representation for the 
ground vehicle system is shown in Figure 3.12. 
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Figure 3.12: The CTBN representation of ground vehicle system 
There is no redundancy in this system; all subsystems and components are in 
series structures. As discussed in the previous subsection, the subsystem repair policies 
are identical to the component repair policies in this system. Furthermore, without 
redundancy, if one component fails, the whole system fails. Then other components stop 
operating and cannot fail, but they are still in good state (case 2 of PDEP gate, Section 
3.2.4). Thus only one component would fail each time and one repair crew would be 
enough. Based on the discussion above, in this example we just need to consider the CR 
policy. The CIMs for some nodes are shown for Table 3.32 to Table 3.34. Nodes CO, TR, 
EL have similar CIMs with node SU; Nodes WT, BO, AX and EG have similar CIMs 
with node BR; Node PT and Vehicle have similar CIMs with node CH. The double arrow 
dash green links in this example work in this way: when a component fails, it will bring 
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down the subsystem and finally bring down the whole vehicle. On the other hand, when 
the subsystem/system fails, if the component is in failure state, it will start the repair 
procedure automatically; if it is in other states, it will stay in those states. These model 
the situation when a subsystem is brought down by one component. Only the failed 
component needs repair, other components would stay in their current state due to the 
facts that when the subsystem fails, other components stop operating. All nodes are in 
good state at the beginning.   
 
Table 3.32: CIM for node SU for ground vehicle example 
CH(good) 
 
State SU(good) SU(moderate) SU(failed) 
SU(good) −}!, }!, 0 
SU(moderate) 0 −}!,  }!,  
SU(failed) }! 0 −}! 
CH(failed) 
State SU(good) SU(moderate) SU(failed) 
SU(good) 0 0 0 
SU(moderate) 0 0 0 
SU(failed) }! 0 −}! 
CH(standby) 
State SU(good) SU(moderate) SU(failed) 
SU(good) 0 0 0 
SU(moderate) 0 0 0 
SU(failed) }! 0 −}! 
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Table 3.33: CIM for node BR of ground vehicle example 
CH(good) 
 
SU(good) 
State BR(good) BR(failed) 
BR(good) −¸¹, ¸¹, 
BR(failed) ¸¹ −¸¹ 
SU(moderate) 
State B(good) B(failed) 
BR(good) −¸¹,  ¸¹,  
BR(failed) ¸¹ −¸¹ 
SU(failed) 
State B(good) B(failed) 
BR(good) −¸¹,  ¸¹,  
BR(failed) ¸¹ −¸¹ 
CH(failed) 
SU(good) 
State BR(good) BR(failed) 
BR(good) 0 0 
BR(failed) ¸¹ −¸¹ 
SU(moderate) 
State B(good) B(failed) 
BR(good) 0 0 
BR(failed) ¸¹ −¸¹ 
SU(failed) 
State B(good) B(failed) 
BR(good) 0 0 
BR(failed) ¸¹ −¸¹ 
CH(standby) 
SU(good) 
State BR(good) BR(failed) 
BR(good) 0 0 
BR(failed) ¸¹ −¸¹ 
SU(moderate) 
State B(good) B(failed) 
BR(good) 0 0 
BR(failed) ¸¹ −¸¹ 
SU(failed) 
State B(good) B(failed) 
BR(good) 0 0 
BR(failed) ¸¹ −¸¹ 
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Table 3.34: CIM for node CH for ground vehicle example 
Vehicle(good) BR, WT, AX and 
SU are all in 
good state 
State CH(good) CH(failed) CH(repair) 
CH(good) 0 0 0 
CH(failed) ∞ −∞ 0 
CH(repair) ∞ 0 −∞ 
One of BR, WT, 
AX or SU fails 
State CH(good) CH(failed) CH(repair) 
CH(good) −∞ ∞ 0 
CH(failed) 0 0 0 
CH(repair) 0 0 0 
Vehicle(failed) BR, WT, AX and 
SU are all in  
Good state 
State CH(good) CH(failed) CH(repair) 
CH(good) 0 0 0 
CH(failed) ∞ −∞ 0 
CH(repair) 0 0 0 
One of BR, WT, 
AX or SU fails 
State CH(good) CH(failed) CH(repair) 
CH(good) 0 0 0 
CH(failed) 0 −∞ ∞ 
CH(repair) 0 0 0 
 
First, we perform the standard reliability analysis (there is no repair action, put all 
repair rates as 0) using Dynamic Bayesian Networks and Continuous Time Bayesian 
Networks. The reliability of the ground vehicle at 10000 miles (200 hours) is .8296 from 
DBNs and .8311 from CTBNs respectably. Next, we will take the repair actions into 
consideration and perform the availability analysis. As we discussed in the previous 
section, in this ground vehicle example, the mean availability is a more practical metric 
than point availability because it indicates how much proportion of time the vehicle is 
operational in a mission period. By using CTBNs, the expected up time is 199.74 hours in 
the first 200 hours. The mean availability for this 200 hours mission period is ̅ =
*ÁÁ.Â©+ = .9987. For DBNs, there is not a direct inference algorithm for calculating the 
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mean availability. However, we can estimate the point availability for each hour of these 
200 hours and get the mean from them. The mean availability from DBNs is .9952 for the 
first 200 hours. We can see that these two results are close to each other. When the 
mission miles increase to 20000 miles (400 hours), the reliability and mean availability 
given by CTBNs are 	 = .6872 and ̅ = ªÁÁ.©Ã© = .9986; and the results given by DBNs 
are 	 = .6869 and ̅ = .9947 respectely. From the results above, we can see that when 
the mission time increase from 200 hours to 400 hours, the reliability decrease from .82 
to .68, while the mean availability is almost stable, both are around .99.  
3.5.3 A Fleet of Vehicles 
This is a practical example taken from our industrial partner. Consider a ground 
combat team consisting of a fleet of ground combat vehicles with different functionalities. 
For example, the Stryker CV (Command Vehicle) (GDLS 2011), the Stryker MGS 
(Mobile Gun System), the Stryker ICV (Infantry Carrier Vehicle), and the Stryker MEV 
(Medical Evacuation Vehicle) et al. Each vehicle is a system and the ground combat team 
has limit number of repair crews shared by these vehicles. For example in Figure 3.13, 
the vehicles ICV, MGS, MEV and CV form a ground combat team. And assume that 
there are two repair crews in this team. The problem is to estimate the mean availability 
per vehicle in this ground combat team. It is calculated in this way: given a mission time 
, we estimate the up time for the four vehicles in the team and then get the average up 
time per vehicle. Finally it is divided by mission time so we can get the mean availability 
per vehicle for this combat team. For security purpose and the proprietary nature of the 
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data, in this study, we use the ground vehicle system in Section 3.5.2 to denote the 
combat vehicles in this ground combat team example and do the demonstration analysis.  
 
Figure 3.13: The ground combat team, consists of a fleet of vehicles 
 
 
Figure 3.14: The CTBN representation for the ground combat team 
ICV CV MEV MGS 
Ground Combat Team 
(Two repair crews) 
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The CTBN modeling of this team is shown in Figure 3.14. From the figure, we 
can see that, for each vehicle, its structure is identical with that of Figure 3.12 in the 
Ground Vehicle Example. We cannot apply the CR repair policy in this example. When a 
component fails, it needs to check whether there are repair crews available or not. The 
CR-limit policy is employed here. There are only two repair crews in this team. If there is 
not a repair crew available, the failed component has to wait; if there are repair crews 
available, the failed component can be repaired immediately. The green M node is the 
maintenance node, which assigns and reclaims repair crews to and from vehicles. Besides 
the functionalities in ground vehicle example, the double arrow dash green links here also 
do the following works: when a component fails, a repair crew would be assigned from 
M node to vehicle node if there is one available; and the vehicle node will assign the 
repair crew to subsystem and the subsystem will pass on it to the component. After the 
component is repaired and back to working state, it returns the repair crew back to the 
subsystem; and then the subsystem passes on it to the vehicle node and finally to the M 
node. In this study, we simply put the subsystems of the four vehicle having the same 
failure rates and repair rates as those in the ground vehicle example.  
By using CTBNs, the mean availability per vehicle for the mission time of 400 
hours is .9397. It is less than the result of .9986 from ground vehicle example (Section 
3.5.2) because there are only 2 repair crews available in this example; while there is not 
limitation for repair crews in ground vehicle example. The mean availability per vehicle 
changes as the number of repair crew changes. When the number of repair crews 
decreases to 1, the mean availability decreases to .9016; when the number of repair crews 
increase to 3, the mean availability is .9713; when the number of repair crews is 4 or 
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more, the mean availability is .9983, which is almost identical to the result from ground 
vehicle system example. This can be explained by the fact that, when there are 4, or more 
than 4 repair crews available, it is identical to that case with unlimited repair crews 
because there are only 4 vehicles in this fleet. 
Table 3.35: CIM for node SU in the fleet example 
CH(good) State SU(good) SU(moderate) SU(failed) SU(repair) 
SU(good) −}!, }!, 0 0 
SU(moderate) 0 −}!,  }!,  0 
SU(failed) 0 0 0 0 
SU(repair) 0 0 ∞ −∞ 
CH(failed) 
or  
CH(standby) 
State SU(good) SU(moderate) SU(failed) SU(repair) 
SU(good) 0 0 0 0 
SU(moderate) 0 0 0 0 
SU(failed) 0 0 0 0 
SU(repair) 0 0 0 0 
CH(repair) State SU(good) SU(moderate) SU(failed) SU(repair) 
SU(good) 0 0 0 0 
SU(moderate) 0 0 0 0 
SU(failed) 0 0 −∞ −∞ 
SU(repair) }! 0 0 −}! 
 
Table 3.36: CIM for node BR in the fleet example 
CH(good) SU(good) 
 
 
State BR(good) BR(failed) BR(repair) 
BR(good) −¸¹, ¸¹, 0 
BR(failed) 0 0 0 
BR(repair) 0 ∞ −∞ 
SU(moderate) 
 
 
State B(good) B(failed) BR(repair) 
BR(good) −¸¹,  ¸¹,  0 
BR(failed) 0 0 0 
BR(repair) 0 ∞ −∞ 
SU(failed) State B(good) B(failed) BR(repair) 
BR(good) 0 0 0 
BR(failed) 0 0 0 
BR(repair) 0 ∞ −∞ 
SU(repair) State B(good) B(failed) BR(repair) 
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BR(good) 0 0 0 
BR(failed) 0 0 0 
BR(repair) ∞ 0 −∞ 
CH(failed) SU(.) 
 
State BR(good) BR(failed) BR(repair) 
BR(good) 0 0 0 
BR(failed) 0 0 0 
BR(repair) ∞ 0 −∞ 
CH(standby) SU(.) 
 
State BR(good) BR(failed) BR(repair) 
BR(good) 0 0 0 
BR(failed) 0 0 0 
BR(repair) ¸¹ 0 −¸¹ 
CH(repair) SU(good) 
 
State BR(good) BR(failed) BR(repair) 
BR(good) 0 0 0 
BR(failed) 0 0 0 
BR(repair) ¸¹ 0 −¸¹ 
SU(moderate) 
 
 
State BR(good) BR(failed) BR(repair) 
BR(good) 0 0 0 
BR(failed) 0 0 0 
BR(repair) ¸¹ 0 −¸¹ 
SU(failed) State BR(good) BR(failed) BR(repair) 
BR(good) 0 0 0 
BR(failed) 0 0 0 
BR(repair) ¸¹ 0 −¸¹ 
SU(repair) State BR(good) BR(failed) BR(repair) 
BR(good) 0 0 0 
BR(failed) 0 0 0 
BR(repair) ¸¹ 0 −¸¹ 
Table 3.36 Continues 
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Table 3.37: CIM for node CH in the fleet example 
Vehicle(good) 
BR, WT, 
AX and SU 
are all in 
good state 
State CH(good) CH(failed) CH(standby) CH(repair) 
CH(good) 0 0 0 0 
CH(failed) ∞ −∞ 0 0 
CH(standby) ∞ 0 −∞ 0 
CH(repair) ∞ 0 0 −∞ 
Otherwise State CH(good) CH(failed) CH(standby) CH(repair) 
CH(good) −∞ ∞ 0 0 
CH(failed) 0 0 0 0 
CH(standby) 0 ∞ −∞ 0 
CH(repair) 0 0 0 0 
Vehicle(failed) 
BR, WT, 
AX and 
SU are all in  
good state 
State CH(good) CH(failed) CH(standby) CH(repair) 
CH(good) 0 0 0 0 
CH(failed) ∞ −∞ 0 0 
CH(standby) ∞ 0 −∞ 0 
CH(repair) ∞ 0 0 −∞ 
Otherwise State CH(good) CH(failed) CH(standby) CH(repair) 
CH(good) −∞ ∞ 0 0 
CH(failed) 0 0 0 0 
CH(standby) 0 ∞ −∞ 0 
CH(repair) 0 0 0 0 
Vehicle(repair) 
BR, WT, 
AX and  
SU are all in  
Good state 
State CH(good) CH(failed) CH(standby) CH(repair) 
CH(good) 0 0 0 0 
CH(failed) ∞ −∞ 0 0 
CH(standby) ∞ 0 −∞ 0 
CH(repair) ∞ 0 0 −∞ 
Otherwise State CH(good) CH(failed) CH(standby) CH(repair) 
CH(good) −∞ ∞ 0 0 
CH(failed) 0 −∞ 0 ∞ 
CH(standby) 0 ∞ −∞ 0 
CH(repair) 0 0 0 0 
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Table 3.38: CIM for node Vehicle in the fleet example 
M(2), M(1) 
CH, BO, PT and 
EL are all in 
good state 
State Vehicle 
(good) 
Vehicle 
(failed) 
Vehicle 
(repair) 
Vehicle (good) 0 0 0 
Vehicle (failed) ∞ −∞ 0 
Vehicle (repair) ∞ 0 −∞ 
Otherwise State Vehicle 
(good) 
Vehicle 
(failed) 
Vehicle 
(repair) 
Vehicle (good) −∞ ∞ 0 
Vehicle (failed) 0 −∞ ∞ 
Vehicle (repair) 0 0 0 
M(0) 
CH, BO, PT and 
EL are all in  
Good state 
State Vehicle 
(good) 
Vehicle 
(failed) 
Vehicle 
(repair) 
Vehicle (good) 0 0 0 
Vehicle (failed) ∞ −∞ 0 
Vehicle (repair) ∞ 0 −∞ 
Otherwise State Vehicle 
(good) 
Vehicle 
(failed) 
Vehicle 
(repair) 
Vehicle (good) −∞ ∞ 0 
Vehicle (failed) 0 0 0 
Vehicle (repair) 0 0 0 
 
Table 3.39: CIM for node M in the fleet example 
# of vehicle in state  
Repair =0 
State M(2) M(1) M(0) 
M(2) 0 0 0 
M(1) ∞ −∞ 0 
M(0) ∞ 0 −∞ 
# of vehicle in state  
Repair =1 
State M(2) M(1) M(0) 
M(2) −∞ ∞ 0 
M(1) 0 0 0 
M(0) 0 ∞ −∞ 
# of vehicle in state  
Repair >=2 
State M(2) M(1) M(0) 
M(2) −∞ 0 ∞ 
M(1) 0 −∞ ∞ 
M(0) 0 0 0 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we propose CTBN formalism for RAM modeling of dynamic 
repairable systems. We also show how to translate special purpose FT gates, called 
dynamic gates, into the framework of CTBNs. We applied our proposed method to three 
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case examples derived from practical application. We evaluated the performance of our 
method and compared to other methods in the case examples. The numerical results 
shows that the proposed method is as accurate as the traditional methods, which indicates 
that it is a good alternative for existing RAM modeling methods.  
In the next chapter, in the system design optimization framework, we will employ 
CTBNs as a reliability (availability) estimation method to calculate the system reliability 
(availability) and do the system design optimization analysis.  
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Chapter 4 System Design Optimization Using NSGA-II and CTBNs 
 
In this chapter, we propose a system design framework for systems with dynamic 
failure behaviors or various repair policies. The CTBNs are used to estimate the 
reliability (availability) and the multi-objective GA algorithm NSGA-II is implemented 
to solve for the Pareto solutions. We first provide the background about multi-objective 
optimization and a brief introduction of NSGA-II, and then present the NSGA-II+CTBNs 
system design optimization framework. Finally, to show how this framework works, a 
case example is demonstrated.  
4.1 Multi-objective Optimization Problem 
In general, for a problem with '  objective functions, the multi-objective 
formulation can be formulated as follows: 
min ÇA()) 	ÇTQ	R = 1,2, … , ' 
Subject to 
lB()) ≤ 0,  = 1,2, … , È, 
ℎ()) = 0, y = 1,2, … , . 
There are ' objective functions and  variables so Ç()) is an ' dimensional vector, and ) 
is a  dimensional vector corresponding to  decision variables. Solutions to a multi-
objective optimization problem are often mathematically expressed in terms of non-
dominated or superior points. Non-dominance can be defined as: in a minimization 
problem, a solution )* dominated a solution )+ (a), if and only if )* is no worse than )+ 
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in all objectives, i.e.ÇA()*) ≤ ÇA()+)	∀	R,  ∈ {1,2, … , '}; and (b), )*is strictly better than 
)+  in at least one objective, i.e. ÇA()*) < ÇA()+) for at least one	R . Thus, instead of a 
unique solution to the problem, the solution to a multi-objective optimization problem is 
a set of Pareto-optimal points (Zeleny 1982).  
Generally there are two common ways to solve multi-objective problems: 1) 
combine them into a single objective function and obtain a single solution such as in the 
cases of weighted sum method or utility function, or 2) obtain a set of non-dominated 
Pareto-optimal solutions. 
For multi-objective problems, it can be problematic to combine the objectives into 
a single objective (e.g. weighted sum method, utility functions) to obtain a single solution. 
A slight perturbation in the parameters used to combine the objectives could result in 
very different optimal solutions. This can be a problem because the exact objective 
function weights or utility functions are often not that clear. The Pareto set includes all 
rational choices, among which we have to select the final solution by trading the 
objectives again each other. The search is then not for one optimal solution but for a set 
of solutions that are optimal in a broader sense, i.e. they are Pareto-optimal.  
4.1.1 Multi-objective GAs 
In this study, we use CTBNs to estimate the system reliability (availability). Thus 
at least one objective function is non-close-form; it is black-box type. For black-box type 
optimization problem, meta-heuristic based methods like GAs are the most efficiency 
approaches to solve them. Genetic Algorithm (GA) was proposed by Holland (Holland 
1975). GAs are a particular class of evolutionary algorithms that uses techniques inspired 
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by some mechanisms of natural selection. They are essentially search techniques used to 
find approximate solutions to difficult combinatorial optimization problems.  
The GA starts with a population of random individuals (chromosomes) that are 
revised over successive generations. The crossover and mutation operators are used to 
introduce new prospective design solutions each generation. During each successive 
generation, each individual is evaluated and a value of fitness is returned by a fitness 
function. Individuals with high-fitness values rank at the top while individuals with low-
fitness values are likely to be abandoned from the population. The algorithm continues 
for a pre-determined maximum number of generations or until no additional 
improvement is observed.  
Several versions of multi-objective GAs, most often referred as multi-objective 
evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs), have been developed, such as: 
 Vector evaluated genetic algorithm (VEGA)  (Schaffer 1985); 
 Multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) (Fonseca and Fleming 1993); 
 Niched-Pareto genetic algorithm (NPGA) (Horn, Nafpliotis et al. 1994); 
 Non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm (NSGA) (Srinivas and Deb 1994); 
 Strength Pareto evolutionary algorithm (SPEA) (Zitzler and Thiele 1999); 
 Non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm-II (NSGA-II) (Deb, Pratap et al. 
2002). 
As a well-know MOEA, the NSGA-II is the most widely used and has been 
proven to perform well on various real-world application problems (Coello Coello 2006). 
The pseudo-code of NSGA-II is presented in Algorithm 4.1. 
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We will employ NSGA-II in our system design optimization framework, since 
there have been many studies ensuring that NSGA-II can often converge to Pareto set and 
the obtained solution can often spread well over the Pareto set. NSGA-II takes the fast-
non-dominated-sort mechanism to ensure the well convergence which is shown in 
Algorithm 4.2. Moreover, it adopts the Density Estimation and Crowding Comparison 
Operator (Deb, Pratap et al. 2002) to cut the solutions which have bad distributions so as 
to obtain a good spread of solutions. The above merits of NSGA-II make it a promising 
choice of solving the black-box type problem in our study. For more details of NSGA-II, 
one can refer to the paper (Deb, Pratap et al. 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 4.1: The Pseudo-Code of NSGA-II 
___________________________________________________ 
1: Set the parent vector	2 = ∅, the offspring vector	4 = ∅, the collect vector 	 = ∅ and the     
    generation number	 = 0. 
2: Initialize the parent vector2. 
3: While  < the terminate generation number do 
4:       (1) Combine the parent and offspring population via 	 = 2 ∪ 4 
5:       (2) Sort all solutions of 	 to get all non-dominated fronts Ì =fast-non-dominated-sort(	) 
          where Ì = (Ì*, Ì+, … ). 
6:       (3) Set 21* = ∅ and R = 1 
7:       (4) 
8:       While the parent population size |21*| + |ÌA| < b do 
9:             (a) Calculate crowding-distance of ÌA. 
10:           (b) Add the Rℎ	non-dominated front ÌAto the parent pop 21*. 
11:           (c) R = R + 1. 
12:     End while 
13:     (5) Sort the ÌA according to the crowding distance. 
14:     (6) Fill the parent pop 21* with the first b − |21*| elements of ÌA. 
15:     (7) Generate the offspring population to 41*. 
16:     (8) Set  =  + 1 
17: End while 
18: the population in vector 2 are the non-dominated solutions. 
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4.2 CTBNs and NSGA-II System Design Optimization Framework  
In this study, for system design optimization problem, we only consider three 
system metrics: the system reliability (availability), cost and weight. However, in 
practical application, it is not limited to these three metrics. Consider a system with b 
components and for component 	R , it has ÍA  option for chose, where for option   of 
component	R, the failure rate is	AB, the repair rate is	AB , the cost is SAB and the weight 
is	NAB. If  option is chose for component	R, then	)AB = 1, otherwise,	)AB = 0. 
The system performance metrics are shown as follows: 
The reliability 		  (availability 	 ) of the system can be estimated by CTBNs. For a 
specified system, a CTBN is constructed.  
Algorithm 4.2: The Pseudo-Code for the function: fast-non-dominated-sort(P) 
___________________________________________________ 
1: For each population  in the 2, we get the solutions which  dominates and save these  
solutions into c". We also need to calculate the '" which is the number of solutions which  
dominates . 
2: Find the solutions whose '" = 0 and add them to the first front Ì*. 
3: Initialize the front counter R = 1. 
4: While ÌA is not empty do 
5:       Set the temp vector 4 = ∅ 
6:       For each  ∈ ÌA do 
7:             For each 7 ∈ c" do 
8:                    'Î = 'Î − 1. 
9:                    if 'Î = 0 then add 7 to the 4. 
10:           End for 
11:     End for 
12:     i= R + 1 and the solutions in 4 compose the ÌA 
13: End while 
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	/ = sbOÏÐÑ)*B*B¬8Bf* ,Ñ)*B*B
¬8
Bf* Ò ,… , ÐÑ)eBeB
¬¶
Bf* ,Ñ)eBeB
¬¶
Bf* ÒÓ 
where  is the selected option for components.  
We assume that the system cost and weight are simply the summation of each 
component: 
 =ÑÑ)ABSAB¬?Bf*
e
Af*  
H =ÑÑ)ABNAB¬?Bf*
e
Af*  
And the system design optimization problem can be formula as: 
ÔÕÕ
Ö
ÕÕ×maxsbOÏÐÑ)*B*B
¬8
Bf* ,Ñ)*B*B
¬8
Bf* Ò ,… , ÐÑ)eBeB
¬¶
Bf* ,Ñ)eBeB
¬¶
Bf* ÒÓ ,
minÑÑ)ABSAB¬?Bf*
e
Af* , minÑÑ)ABNAB
¬?
Bf*
e
Af* ÙÕÕ
Ú
ÕÕÛ
 
Subject to  
∑ )AB¬?Bf* = 1 for R = 1,2, … ,b 
4.2.1 Chromosomal Representation 
In this study, binary coding scheme is employed. The length of chromosome 
is	∑ ÍAeAf* .  
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The first Í*bits are for the	Í* options of component 1. Each bit is corresponding 
to one option, if the option is chose, it is 1 otherwise it is 0. From Í* + 1 bit to Í* +Í+ 
bits are for options of component 2. The arrangements of remaining components are 
similar to component 2.  For example, consider Figure 4.1, the chromosome contains 
twelve bits for a configuration which consists of three components, with options of four 
for each component. For component1, the 1st option is chose, for component 2, the 2nd 
option is chose and the last option is chose for component 3.  
 
Figure 4.1: Encoding of the solutions 
4.2.2 Genetic Operator 
On the basis of coding scheme, we adopt the single-point crossover and bitwise 
mutation for NSGA-II. The detailed implementations of them are presented in Figure 4.2.  
In order to guide the search within the feasible region, we utilize the constraint 
handling approach based on the concept of constrained-dominate proposed in the paper 
(Deb, Pratap et al. 2002). Concretely, a solution R constrained-dominates  must satisfy 
one of the following three conditions: 1) Solution R is feasible but solution  is not; 2) 
Solution R  and 	 are both feasible, and R	  dominates  ; 3) Solution R	 and   are both 
infeasible, but R violates less constraints than .  
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
   
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
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Figure 4.2: Crossover and Mutation 
4.3 Case Example: Ground Vehicle System Design 
To demonstrate the proposed system design optimization framework, the ground 
vehicle system example (Section 3.5.2) in the previous chapter is considered. In this 
example, except body subsystem and electrical subsystem, other subsystems all have four 
levels of options for chose. Each level has different failure rates, cost and weight as 
shown in Table 4.1.   
The system performance metrics are system reliability, cost and weight. The 
parameter settings of NSGA-II are as follows: the crossover probability is set to be .9 and 
the mutation rate is .001. The terminate generation is set to 50 and the population size is 
500. 
Ü ÜÝ ÜÞ Üß … Üà 
ÜÝ ÜÝÝ ÜÝÞ ÜÝß … ÜÝà 
Ü ÜÝ ÜÞ ÜÝß … ÜÝà 
ÜÝ ÜÝÝ ÜÝÞ Üß … Üà 
Exchange the bits 
after crossover 
point 
Ü … Üá … Üâ … Üà Ü … Üâ … Üá … Üà Exchange two bits s*A and s*B   
Bitwise mutation on s*A 
Single point crossover between s* and s+ 
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Figure 4.3 shows the 104 solutions found in the Pareto-front. To better visualize the 
solutions obtained, figure 4.4 and figure 4.5 show the two dimensional representation of 
the same solutions.  
Table 4.1: Choices for each subsystem of Series-Parallel system 
Subsyst
ems 
Failure Measure Cost Weight 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
BR .5e-3 .3e-3 .62e-3 .43e-3 9 12 9 8 21 26 19 34 
WT .16e-3 .21e-3 .23e-3 .28e-3 5 4 3 6 35 45 43 45 
AX .5e-4 .3e-4 .7e-4 .6e-3 4 9 7 6 65 47 38 42 
SU .5e-4 .7e-4 .6e-4 .9e-4 7 7 9 6 43 17 34 26 
TR .83e-4 .67e-4 .91e-4 .68e-4 12 14 13 17 23 32 42 45 
EG .23e-4 .33e-4 .27e-4 .35e-4 6 6 5 8 98 79 86 89 
CO .33e-4 .28e-4 .25e-4 .36e-4 8 9 8 4 12 19 27 34 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Unreliability vs Cost vs Weight 
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Figure 4.4: Unreliability vs Cost (left); Unreliability vs Weight (right) 
 
Figure 4.5: Cost vs Weight 
As we discussed before, there are limitations in meta-heuristic based-methods like 
NSGA-II. There is no guarantee that the solutions are globally optimal. However, for 
black-box type optimization problems, NSGA-II is the most efficient way to solve it 
currently. In the next chapter, for systems with simple structures (series/parallel) and 
close-form objective functions, we propose a modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method to 
identify all Pareto-optimal solutions. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
We have presented a system design optimization framework for systems with 
dynamic behaviors or various repair policies. We employ the CTBNs to estimate the 
system reliability (availability) and put it as a multi-objective optimization problem and 
then use NSGA-II to solve it. Finally, the proposed framework is applied to an example 
of a ground vehicle system to illustrate its performance.   
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Chapter 5 System Design Optimization using Modified Adaptive ϵ-
Constraint Method 
 
In the previous section, for systems with dynamic behavior or various repair 
policy, we present a CTBNs and NSGA-II based system design optimization framework. 
However, as we mentioned before, NSGA-II cannot guarantee globally optimal. In this 
chapter, for systems with simple structures (series/parallel) and close-form objective 
functions, we proposed a modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method to identify all the Pareto-
optimal solutions for the system design optimization analysis. A brief introduction of 
traditional ϵ-constraint method and adaptive ϵ-constraint method are given. Then we 
present the modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method in detail. Finally the proposed method 
is implemented in two case examples to evaluate its performance with NSGA-II and 
other ϵ-constraint methods. The first case example is the well-known Redundancy 
Allocation Problem (RAP) in Series-Parallel systems. The other case example is a 
practical configuration selection problem which is taken from our industrial partner.  
5.1 The Traditional ϵ-constraint Methods 
The traditional %-constraint method is a multi-objective optimization technique 
proposed by Chankong and Haimes (Chankong and Haimes 1983) for generating Pareto-
optimal solutions. It transforms the multi-objective problem into a series of several 
single-objective problems with updated constraints, using the following procedure: 
R' ÇA) 
s.t. ÇB) ≤ ãB 			ÇTQ	JKK	 = 1,2, … ,,			 ≠ R 
where 
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R ∈ (1,2,3, … ,. 
% = %*, %+, … , %  are the upper bounds of each objective function 
In order to identify all non-dominated solutions, the vector of upper bounds must 
be varied (iteratively increase or decrease by a pre-defined constant	∆) along the Pareto 
front for each objective and perform a new optimization process for each new upper 
bound vector. The generation of different non-dominated points using different upper 
bound values is illustrated in bi-objective case in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: An illustrative example of Generating different solutions with the traditional 
ϵ-constraint method generating different solutions sequentially under two objective 
functions that need to be minimized 
There are two limitations to the traditional	%-constraint method. Firstly, it is the 
necessity to choose a pre-defined constant		∆. Since only one solution can be found in 
each interval, the discretization has to be fine enough not to “miss” any Pareto-optimal 
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solution. As shown in Figure 5.1, there are two Pareto-optimal points in iteration 3. 
However, solution O+© (highlighted in red) is missed due to the larger		∆. Second, it will 
identify non-Pareto-optimal solution. The main reason is that it is just takes one objective 
function into consideration. Let’s look back to Figure 5.1 again. In iteration 4, the two 
solutions have the same fitness value of	Ç*, so both of them are identified as solution. 
However, solution y is not a Pareto-optimal solution and is dominated by solution	O+æ.  
The traditional %-constraint method can be summarized as follows. 
 
To cope with the drawback of the traditional %-constraint method, Ozlen (Ozlen 
and Azizoglu 2009) presented an adaptive ϵ-constraint method for the multi-objective 
integer programming (MOIP) problem. Unlike the traditional %-constraint method which 
determines ϵ by decreasing a fixed	∆ in each iteration, the adaptive %-constraint method 
uses an adaptive % value. It determines the % based on the solutions of previous iteration. 
1:		c = ∅ 
Algorithm 5.1: The traditional -constraint method 
 
Input 
Objective bounds	ÇA, ÇA for each R ∈ (2,… ,. 
Increments ∆A for each R ∈ (2,… ,. 
Output 
Set of solution contain Pareto-optimal solution set c 
___________________________________________________ 
2:  For ã+ ≔ Ç+ to Ç+ step ∆+ do 
3:       For ãª ≔ Çª to Çª step ∆ª do 
4:       ⋮ 
5:             For ã  ≔ Ç  to Ç  step ∆  do 
6:                   Solve (1) for ), c ≔ c ∪ )  
7:             End for 
8:       	⋮ 
9:        End for 
10: End for 
11: Return c 
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This increases the efficiency of the algorithm dramatically and will not miss a single 
Pareto-optimal solution. In order to avoid identifying non-Pareto-optimal solutions, 
instead of using a single objective function by implementing a proper weight for each 
objective function, the adaptive %-constraint method constructs a new single objective 
function (which is a weighted sum of all the original objective functions) and solves this 
new objective function. This way, it takes all objective functions into consideration 
during the search.  
 
Figure 5.2: An illustrative example of the adaptive  ϵ-constraint method generating 
different solutions sequentially under two objective functions that need to be minimized 
Let’s reconsider a tri-objective problem: 
è:	R'(	Ç*), Ç+), Çª).	 
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O+
*
 
O+
+
 
O+
ª
 
O+
©
 
O+
æ
 
y 
89 
 
 
 
The specific weighted sum single objective function problem solved by the ϵ-adaptive 
constraint method is: 
èÝ:	R' 	Ç*) + N+Ç+) + NªÇª).	 
N+ =
*
ê9
¦ëê9
¦ì1*
,	 Nª =
í9
êî
¦ëêî
¦ì1*
 
O. .	 
Ç+ < ϵ+ 
Çª < ϵª 
Here Ç+£i , Ç+£ï, Çª£i  and Çª£ï  are the upper and lower bounds on Ç+)  and Çª)  
values of any feasible solution respectively.   
The weight for Ç*  is 1, and since all objective functions are linear integer 
functions, the minimal increment of Ç*is 1, which is always greater than the maximal 
increment of	Ç+. By the same logic, the maximal increment of Çª is always less than the 
minimal increment of	Ç+. These weights make sure that Ç*	has the high priority, then Ç+ 
and	Çª. Let’s look back to the bi-objective problem in Figure 5.2 again. In iteration 4, 
under the constraint determined by solution in iteration 3, we cannot miss solution O+© (red 
point). While in iteration 5, the yellow point y and O+æ have the same Ç* value. However, 
since we use the weight sum objective function, we also take Ç+ into consideration. With 
Ç+ included, obviously yellow point y is a dominated point.  
The proposed approach of assigning proper weights to the objectives thus allows 
one to solve the weighted sum objective function and still maintain the hierarchy of the 
multiple objectives. The adaptive %-constraint method to solve P1 can be summarized as 
follows. 
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The adaptive % -constraint method improves the efficiency over the traditional 
method significantly. However, there are still drawbacks in this method. It has the 
potential to identify a lot of identical solutions. In order to illustrate this inefficiency and 
introduce our method, let us consider a numerical example taken from Ozlen’s paper 
(Ozlen and Azizoglu 2009). 
NA =
NA*
	ÇA
£i , 	ÇA
£ï, +1
,w* = 1 
Ç = Ç* + N+Ç+ +⋯+N Ç  
1:	c = ∅ 
Algorithm 5.2: The adaptive -constraint method 
 
Input 
Objective bounds	ÇA£ï, 	ÇA£ifor each	R ∈ (2, … ,.,  
%A = 	ÇA
£i
, R ∈ (2,… ,., ÇKJl = 1 
Output 
Set of Pareto-optimal solution set c 
_________________________________________________ 
2: While ÇKJl = 1	do  
3:      ϵ * ≔ Ç *£i 
4:      While ÇKJl = 1 do 
5:            ϵ + ≔ Ç +£i 
6:      								 ⋮ 
7:            ϵ+ ≔ Ç+£i 
8:            While ÇKJl = 1 do 
9:                     Solve (1) for ),  
10:                  If the solution is impossible  
11:                         ÇKJl = 0 
12:                   Else  
13:                         c+ ≔ c+ ∪ ), ã+ ≔ Ç+)  1 
14:                   End if 
15:           End while 
16:           (ϵª ≔ maxÇª)  1: ) ∈ c+., 	cª ≔ cª ∪ c+ 
17:           ⋮ 
18:     End while 
19: 				(ϵ  ≔ maxÇ )  1: ) ∈ c *, .	c  ≔ c  ∪ c * 
20: End while 
21:	c ≔ c  
22: Return c 
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Numerical Example 
This is a 5×5 Tri-objective Assignment Problem (TAP). Table 1 has the three 
objective coefficients for assigning each row to each column. Each solution is 
represented by a sequence of column index values assigned to row 1 through 5. 
Accordingly, in sequence 5-4-3-2-1, row 1 is assigned to column 5 and row 2 is assigned 
to column 5. 
Using the single-objective assignment solutions one can identify general upper 
and lower bounds on the individual objectives as  
Ç* = 86, 2  1  4  3  5 
Ç+ = 128, 1  5  4  3  2 
Çª = 129, 3  2  1  5  4 
Ç* = 358, 4  2  3  5  1 
Ç+ = 411, 4  2  1  5  3 
Çª = 451, 4  5  3  1  2 
Table 5.1: Three objective coefficients for the numerical example problem 
S* 1 2 3 4 5  S+ 1 2 3 4 5  S+ 1 2 3 4 5 
1 99 19 74 55 41 1 28 39 19 42 7 1 29 67 2 90 7 
2 23 81 93 39 49 2 66 98 49 83 42 2 84 37 64 64 87 
3 66 21 63 24 66 3 73 26 42 13 54 3 54 11 100 83 61 
4 65 41 7 39 66 4 46 42 28 27 99 4 75 63 69 96 3 
5 93 30 5 4 13 5 80 17 99 59 68 5 66 99 34 33 21 
 
The iteration details of algorithm 5.2 are presented in Table 5.2. We report the 
number of IPs solved and the %+ and %ª bound values. The objective function values of 
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the bi-objective solutions are stated in group each representing a single execution the 
“while loop” from step 8 to step 15 in algorithm 5.2.  
Table 5.2: The iteration details 
G1 %ª ≤ 451 %+ ≤  G2 %ª ≤ 366 %+ ≤  G3 %ª ≤ 341 %+ ≤ 
# Ç* Ç+ Çª  # Ç* Ç+ Çª  # Ç* Ç+ Çª  
1 86 214 324 411 6 86 214 324 411 10 86 214 324 411 
2 96 186 204 213 7 96 186 204 213 11 96 186 204 213 
3 125 131 342 185 8 125 131 342 185 12 180 183 229 185 
4 209 128 367 130 9 Infeasible 130 13 253 132 328 182 
5 Infeasible 127    14 Infeasible   
 Max(Çª) 367   Max(Çª) 342   Max(Çª) 328  
   
G4 %ª ≤ 327 %+ ≤ G5 %ª ≤ 323 %+ ≤ G6 %ª ≤ 319 %+ ≤ 
# Ç* Ç+ Çª  # Ç* Ç+ Çª  # Ç* Ç+ Çª  
15 86 214 324 411 20 91 246 314 411 25 91 246 314 411 
16 96 186 204 213 21 96 186 204 245 26 96 186 204 245 
17 180 183 229 185 22 180 183 229 185 27 180 183 229 185 
18 269 173 320 182 23 269 173 320 182 28 Infeasible 182 
19 Infeasible  24 Infeasible 172    
 Max(Çª) 324   Max(Çª) 320   Max(Çª) 314  
   
G7 %ª ≤ 313 %+ ≤ G8 %ª ≤ 228 %+ ≤ G9 %ª ≤ 203 %+ ≤ 
# Ç* Ç+ Çª  # Ç* Ç+ Çª  # Ç* Ç+ Çª  
29 96 186 204 411 32 96 186 204 411 34 171 261 191 411 
30 180 183 229 185 33 Infeasible 185 35 179 233 194 260 
31 Infeasible 182    36 224 187 190 232 
      37    186 
 Max(Çª) 229   Max(Çª) 204   Max(Çª) 194  
   
G 
10 
%ª ≤ 193 %+ ≤ G 
11 
%ª ≤ 190 %+ ≤ G 
12 
%ª ≤ 189 %+ ≤ 
# Ç* Ç+ Çª  # Ç* Ç+ Çª  # Ç* Ç+ Çª  
38 171 261 191 411 42 188 269 133 411 46 188 269 133 411 
39 212 242 173 260 43 212 242 173 268 47 212 242 173 268 
40 224 187 190 241 44 224 187 190 241 48 Infeasible 241 
41 Infeasible 186 45 Infeasible 186    
 Max(Çª) 191   Max(Çª) 190   Max(Çª) 173  
   
G 
13 
%ª ≤ 172 %+ ≤ G 
14 
%ª ≤ 139 %+ ≤ G 
15 
%ª ≤ 132 %+ ≤ 
# Ç* Ç+ Çª  # Ç* Ç+ Çª  # Ç* Ç+ Çª  
49 188 269 133 411 52 188 269 133 411 54 291 348 129 411 
50 283 261 140 268 53 Infeasible 268 55 Infeasible 347 
51 Infeasible 260       
 Max(Çª) 140   Max(Çª) 133   Max(Çª) 129  
           
G 
16 
%ª ≤ 128 %+ ≤           
# Ç* Ç+ Çª            
56 Infeasible 411           
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From Table 5.2, we can see that a total of 56 Integer Programming (IP) are solved 
to identify 15 unique tri-objective non-dominated solutions. The 15 non-dominated 
solutions are listed in Table 5.3. 56 IP are solved to get only 15 unique solutions. From 
Table 5.2, we also can see that there are so many identical solutions between groups. If 
we can skip solving the duplicated solutions, we can speed up the search and increase the 
algorithm efficiency significantly. This is the motivation for proposing the modified 
adaptive ϵ-constraint method. 
Table 5.3: The Pareto-optimal solutions for the numerical example problem 
Solutions Ç* Ç+ Çª 
1 86 214 324 
2 91 246 314 
3 96 186 204 
4 125 131 342 
5 171 261 191 
6 179 233 194 
7 180 183 229 
8 188 269 133 
9 209 128 367 
10 212 242 173 
11 224 187 190 
12 253 132 328 
13 269 173 320 
14 283 261 140 
15 291 348 129 
 
5.2 The Modified Adaptive ϵ-Constraint Method 
In order to introduce the modified adaptive %-constraint method, let us reexamine 
the results from group 1 (G1, iterations 1-5) and group 2 (G2, iterations 6-9) of Table 5.2. 
With constraints %+ ≤ 411  and 	%ª ≤ 451 , we get the 1st Pareto-optimal solution to 
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be	Ç* = 86,	Ç+ = 214, and		Çª = 314.  The constraints of the 1st iteration in group 2 
(iteration 6) are %+ ≤ 411 and	%ª ≤ 366. 
The only difference between these two iterations is that the constraint %ª < 451 is 
changed to	%ª ≤ 366. Notice that, with	%ª < 451, the obtained objective value		Çª = 314 
also meets the constraint	%ª ≤ 366. Thus, with the constraints  %+ ≤ 411 and	%ª ≤ 366, 
the solution should be identical to that with constraints %+ ≤ 411 and	%ª ≤ 451, which 
is	Ç* = 86,	Ç+ = 214, and		Çª = 314. Within each group #, the next iteration depends on 
the previous iteration (%+ is the previous	Ç+  1). For each group, if the 1st iteration has 
the identical solution as that of the previous group, the solutions of the following 
iterations in this group will be identical to that of the previous group until it hits the upper 
bound of constraint 	%ª. For example, in group 1 and group 2, since the solution of the 1st 
iterations are the same for these two group, the iteration 7-8 have the same solution as 
iteration 2-3 in group 1, until it violates the constraint 	%ª ≤ 366. The solution of iteration 
9 cannot be identical to that of iteration 4 because Çª = 367 in iteration 4 violates the 
constraint 	%ª ≤ 366 in iteration 9. From the analysis above, we can see that if we skip 
solving for the same solution, we can reduce the number of Integer Programming (IP) 
formulations solved so that the whole search procedure can be speeded up. In order to 
avoiding solving for the repeated solutions, we save the previous group temporarily. . 
In particular, we add two refinement strategies to the adaptive % -constraint 
algorithm. The first strategy involves checking solutions from the previous group on the 
current constraint set, in the very first iteration, before attempting to solve the new 
problem. We find the solution O*}ñ	that first violates the current constraint set. If O*}ñ is 
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not the 1st solution in the previous group, let us say it is the yò solution in the previous 
group, then we just copy the first y  1 solutions in the previous group as the first y  1 
solutions in the current group and continuous the outer “while loop” of the Adaptive %-
Constraint Algorithm. If the very first solution of the previous group violates the current 
constraint set, we do not achieve any efficiency; we apply the algorithm as normal. 
However, in the latter case, a second refinement strategy might come in handy. For 
example, let’s look back to group 1 and group 2 in Table 5.2 again. Before processing 
iteration 6 (1st iteration of group 2), we save all solutions in the group 1 and check these 
solutions on the current constraint set (%+ ≤ 411 and	%ª ≤ 366). We can see that the 
4òy = 4 solution violates the constraints. Thus the first 3 solutions from group 1 are 
copied directly as the first three solutions for group 2 and the outer “while loop” of the 
algorithm	continuous in iteration 9, which does not have a possible solution and group 2 
is done.   
As discussed above, within each group, current solution exploits solutions from 
the previous groups. In the second refinement strategy, we check the current solution 
against the solutions in the previous group. If there is an identical solution 	OA-A½¼¾ in 
the previous group, then it is possible that the current iteration will have the same next 
solution as that of	OA-A½¼¾. What we need to do is check the next solution of 	OA-A½¼¾ 
against the current constraint set. If it doesn’t violate current constraints, then we just 
copy this one as our next solution and skip the IP solving. Let us reexamine the numerical 
example from Table 5.2. In group 4 and group 5, the solutions of the first iteration of both 
groups are not identical. However, when we get the solution of iteration 21, we find that 
it is identical to the solution of iteration 16. Then we can check the solution of iteration 
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17 against the current constraint set. It does not violate the constraints in this example, so 
the iteration 17 and 22 should have the same solution and we can skip the IP solving of 
iteration 22. Following the same logic, we can avoid solving the IP and get the solution 
for iteration 23. 
Thus, the modified adaptive %-constraint method is obtained by adding the first 
refinement strategy before step 8 and the second refinement strategy before step 9 of the 
basic adaptive % -constraint method (Algorithm 5.2). The pseudo code for the two 
refinement strategies is provided below. 
  
 
Search Refinement Strategy #1 
 
1: Save solutions of previous group cA* 
2: Check 1
st
 solution in cA* on current constraint 
3: If it doesn’t violate constraints 
4:        Copy solution 1 by 1 in cA* to current group  
5:        As solution until it violate the current constraints         
6: Else 
7:        Process step 8 to 15 in Procedure 1 as normal 
8: End if 
Search Refinement Strategy #2 
 
1:  Save solutions of previous group cA* 
2:  Check current solution with solution set of previous group 
3:  If there is an identical solution 	OA-A½¼¾ in previous group 
4:         Check the solution next to	OA-A½¼¾ again current constraints 
5:         If it doesn’t violate current constraints 
6:                Copy solution as the next solution of current iteration  
7:         Else 
8:                Process step 8 to 15 in Procedure 1 as normal 
9:         End if 
10: Else 
11:       Process step 8 to 15 in Procedure 1 as normal 
12: End if 
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By applying the modified adaptive %-constraint method to the numerical example 
mentioned above (i.e., employ the two search refinement strategies), only 35 IPs are 
needed to be solved to obtain all the 15 unique Pareto-optimal solutions. Compared with 
the 56 IPs needed for the original adaptive %-constraint method, there is 56  35 56⁄ =
37.5%  improvement. To evaluate the proposed method more comprehensively, we 
randomly generated an additional 1000 TAP problem sets (randomly generate 1000 sets 
of matrix 0< SA ≤ 100, R = 1,2,3) and solved them by the two methods. The average 
improvement observed from the 1000 problems is 39%. However, the savings do vary 
from problem to problem. This will be further confirmed by implementing the proposed 
method on the Redundancy Allocation Problem (RAP) for a Series-Parallel system in the 
later sections.  
5.3 Case Example: RAP of Series Parallel System 
The redundancy allocation problem for Series-Parallel systems has received much 
attention in the literature (Oiddir, Rahli et al. 2004; Levitin and Lisninaski 2001; Lyu, 
Rangarajan et al. 2002).  A series-parallel system has a total of O independent subsystems 
arranged in series; and for the R -th subsystem, it can have up to ' ¼5,A  functionally 
equivalent components arranged in parallel. Each component potentially varies in 
reliability, cost, weight and other characteristics. A subsystem can work properly if at 
least one of its components is operational. The 'A  components are selected from A 
available component types where multiple copies of each type can be selected. A typical 
structure of Series-Parallel system is illustrated in Figure 5.3. Increasing the number of 
redundant components will increase the system reliability, but also increases cost and 
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weight. The goal is to optimally allocate the redundant components while balancing 
multiple competing objectives. 
 
Figure 5.3: General Series-Parallel redundancy system 
The formulation of RAP in a multi-objective setting with reliability, cost and weight 
considerations can be presented as: 
max õöÏ1 −öL1 − QABM5?@ ?Bf* Ó
¢
Af* ÷,			min õÑÑSBA)AB
 ?
B
¢
Af* ÷ ,				R' õÑÑNAB)AB
 ?
B
}
Af* ÷			 
s.t. 
1 ≤Ñ)AB ≤ ' ¼5,A			ÇTQ		∀R = 1,2, … , O ?Bf*  
)AB ∈ (0,1,2, … , . 
where: O: the number of subsystems )AB: decision variable, the number of the th type component used in subsystem R  A: the total number of available components for subsystem R ' ¼5,A: the maximum number of components in parallel used in subsystem R QAB, SAB , NAB: the reliability, cost and weight of the th available component for subsystem R 
 
For the multi-objective RAP, the objectives are to determine the optimal design 
configuration that maximize system reliability, minimizes the total cost and minimizes 
the system weight for a Series-Parallel system.  
O
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5.3.1 Decomposition  
In solving multi-objective RAP problems, decomposing the original problem into 
sub-problems and combining the solutions intelligently can greatly aid the process of 
constructing the Pareto-optimal solution set. This is illustrated below. 
We first decompose the original RAP into several sub-problems and solve each 
sub-problem using the modified adaptive %-constraint method so as to identify all the 
non-dominated solutions for each sub-problem. Then, we sequentially filter each pair of 
non-dominated solution sets and pool the resulting solutions together to obtain the non-
dominated solution set for the original RAP. 
Decomposition is generally good for efficiency because of the reduced 
complexity of sub-problems. As a result, non-optimal solutions are filtered out early in 
the process when sub-problems are small and easy to solve. The details of the 
decomposition procedure are illustrated below.  
Let us consider the original RAP P3: 
èÞ:	J) õöÏ1 −öL1 − QABM5?@ ?Bf* Ó
¢
Af* ÷,			R' õÑÑSBA)AB
 ?
B
¢
Af* ÷ ,				R' õÑÑNAB)AB
 ?
B
}
Af* ÷			 
By changing the maximization of reliability to an equivalent minimization formulation, 
we can get P4 as: 
èß:	R' õöÏöL1 − QABM5?@ ?Bf* Ó
}
Af* ÷,			R' õÑÑSBA)AB
 ?
B
}
Af* ÷ ,				R' õÑÑNAB)AB
 ?
B
}
Af* ÷			 
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Further, by using log transformation, we can change the product terms of reliability into 
summation terms of  KTlQkKRJxRKRP and have P5 as: 
èø:	R' õÑKTlÏöL1 − QABM5?@ ?Bf* Ó
}
Af* ÷,			R' õÑÑSBA)AB
 ?
B
}
Af* ÷ ,				R' õÑÑNAB)AB
 ?
B
}
Af* ÷			 
Finally, P5 can be presented as: 
èù:	R' ÐÑÐR' õKTl ÏöL1 − QABM5?@ ?Bf* Ó÷,			R' õÑSBA)AB
 ?
B ÷ ,				R' õÑNAB)AB
 ?
B ÷Ò
}
Af* Ò			 
Thus, the Pareto-optimal solution set of P3 is identical to that of the solution sets from P4, 
P5 and P6.  
P6 can be decomposed into several subsystems. The Pareto-optimal solution set of P6 can 
be obtained by combining the Pareto-optimal solutions sets of each subsystem. The 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 5.4.  
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Figure 5.4: Framework of decomposition based modified adaptive 
 -constraint method for RAP problems 
For subsystem	R, we solve the following sub-problem: 
èú:
ÔÕÕ
Ö
ÕÕ×R' Ç* = õÑSBA)AB
 ?
B ÷ , 	R'	Ç+ = õÑNAB)AB
 ?
B ÷,			
min Çª = õKTlÏöL1 − QABM5?@ ?Bf* Ó÷ ÙÕÕ
Ú
ÕÕÛ			 
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In the proposed method, we assume that all objective functions are linear integer 
functions.  However, in the RAP problem, the reliability objective (or the unreliability 
objective in the transformed formulation) is not an integer. In order to implement the 
proposed method, we need to make some additional modifications. First, the non-integer 
objective function (unreliability) is always set to be the last objective function (Çª) as 
shown in P7. In the adaptive %-constraint method, the weights for each objective function 
are selected so as to guarantee that the maximal increment of any current objective 
function is always less than the minimal increment of previous objective function. In the 
current example, the weight N+  in P2 guarantees that the maximal increment of Ç+  is 
always less than the minimal increment of Ç* (the minimal increment of Ç* is 1 by default 
due to the fact that	Ç* is an integer function); similarly, the weight Nª in P2 guarantees 
that the maximal increment of Çª is always less than the minimal increment of	Ç+. Since 
Çª is the last objective function and deals with reliability, even though it is a non-integer, 
given that there is no additional objective function beyond this objective, we can apply 
the proposed method (ignoring the fact the reliability objective is not integral). The other 
modification necessary to apply the proposed decomposition-based adaptive %-constraint 
method to RAP problems is that, in step 16 of Algorithm 5.2, ãª ≔ max	Çª) − 1 is 
replaced by	ãª ≔ max	Çª) − ∆, here ∆ is a very small number.  
Numerical Example 
In this section, we experimentally compare the proposed method with meta-
heuristic based approach NSGA-II on a RAP for a Series-Parallel system example taken 
from literature (Taboada and Coit 2006). This Series-Parallel system consists of three 
subsystems (O = 3), with an option of five, four and five type of components in each 
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subsystem ( * = 5, 	+ = 4,ª = 5 ) respectively. The maximum number of 
components is seven ((' ¼5,* = ' ¼5,+ = ' ¼5,ª = 7) in each subsystem. Table 5.4 lists 
the component parameters for each subsystem.  
Table 5.4: Component parameters for each subsystem 
Component 
Type â 
Subsystem á 
1 2 3 
Rel. Cost Weight Rel. Cost Weight Rel. Cost Weight 
1 .94 9 9 .97 12 5 .96 10 6 
2 .91 6 6 .86 3 7 .89 6 8 
3 .89 6 4 .70 2 3 .72 4 2 
4 .75 3 7 .66 2 4 .71 3 4 
5 .72 2 8  .67 2 4 
 
The experiments of proposed method and NSGA-II were run on a HP desktop, with an 
AMD Quad-Core CPU operating at 2.3 GHz and 8 GB of RAM. The proposed method is 
coded in MATLAB®R2008b and NSGA-II was coded in C which is taken from the 
website of Deb’s lab (Deb 2005). For NSGA-II, we vary its population size from 100 up 
to 5000, with generation=100, crossover probability= .8 and mutation probability = .008. 
Results from the proposed method and NSGA-II are shown in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Results from the proposed method and NSGA-II 
Our method 
# of Pareto-optimal Points 6,112 
CPU Time (MATLAB R2008b) 1,728 seconds 
NSGA-II 
Population Size 100 200 500 1,000 2,000 4,000 5,000 
# of Pareto Points 85 141 289 589 1,109 2,109 2,324 
# of Pareto-optimal Points 15 27 66 214 558 1,247 1,263 
CPU Time (C) 12s 28s 69s 177s 442s 1,231s 1,699s 
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From Table 5.5, we can see that, the proposed method identifies all 6,112 non-
dominated points in 1,728 seconds. For NSGA-II, the number of Pareto points it 
identified increases as the population size increases. When the population size is 5,000, it 
identified 2,324 Pareto points. However, beside these Pareto points, only parts of them 
are Pareto-optimal points (1,263 out of 2,324). The disadvantages of NSGA-II are that, it 
cannot generate all Pareto-optimal points; and more important, it cannot guarantee all 
points it identified are Pareto-optimal. In other words, NSGA-II gives out a set of Pareto 
points, but it doesn’t tell you which one is Pareto-optimal and which one is not. Figure 
5.5 shows the 6,112 solutions identified by the proposed method in blue start and 1,263 
solutions found by NSGA-II with population size 5,000 in red triangle. Figures 5.6 to 
figure 5.7 show the same results under  two dimensional representations.  
For this problem, the number of IP solved using adaptive %-constraint method is 
5773, while only 1680 IPs need to be solved using our proposed method to identify all 
the Pareto-optimal solutions, translating to an improvement of 	æÂÂª*Ã`æÂÂª = 70.9% . We 
can see that the proposed method outperforms the adaptive ϵ-constraint method 
significantly.  
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Figure 5.5: Pareto-optimal solution obtained by the proposed method  
and NSGA-II for the RAP problem 
                        
Figure 5.6: Pareto-optimal solutions plotted in the space of Reliability vs. Cost (left); 
Reliability vs. Weight (right) 
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Figure 5.7: Pareto-optimal solutions plotted in the space of Cost vs. Weight 
5.4 Case Example: Configuration Selection Problem 
The configuration selection analysis evaluates configuration alternatives based on 
a large set of competing criteria, such as cost, weight and power et al. In this study, we 
implement the proposed modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method on the configuration 
selection problem and compare its results with that of adaptive ϵ-constraint method one 
so as to show its superiority.  
The configuration selection problem considered in this study has three linear 
integer objective functions. They are minimizing the cost, weight and maximizing the 
power (combat power). The system consists of eleven subsystems. There are four options 
for choosing in subsystem 3 and subsystem 10, three options for choosing in subsystem 6. 
All other subsystems have five options and total there are 51 options. The cost, weight 
and power for each option are listed in Table 5.6. The interaction constraints include five 
in-compatible (IC) constraints, eight pre-requisite (PR) constraints and six co-requisite 
(CR) constraints. The in-compatible constraint, s  means if option  is chose, then 
option s  cannot be chose or vice versa. The pre-requisite constraint , s  means if 
option s is chose, option  also must be chose while it doesn’t happen in vice versa case. 
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The co-requisite constraint , s means option  and option s have to be chose together. 
The five in-compatible constraints are: {(Opt9_1, Opt2_4), (Opt5_5, Opt3_1), (Opt9_5, 
Opt4_1), (Opt2_3, Opt7_3), (Opt8_3, Opt10_4)}; the eight pre-requisite are: {(Opt4_3, 
Opt2_3), (Opt1_2, Opt3_2), (Opt5_5, Opt4_4), (Opt11_4, Opt5_5), (Opt9_5, Opt7_4), 
(Opt5_4, Opt8_4), (Opt7_4, Opt8_4), (Opt10_3, Opt9_5)}; the six co-requisite 
constraints are: {(Opt7_1, Opt4_3), (Opt10_4, Opt5_4), (Opt8_4, Opt6_2), (Opt11_1, 
Opt7_4), (Opt7_5, Opt9_4), (Opt3_2, Opt10_2)}. And the problem can be formulated as: 
Ðmin =ÑÑ)ABSAB
¬@
Bf*
**
Af* , minH =ÑÑ)ABNAB
¬@
Bf*
**
Af* , max 2 =ÑÑ)ABAB
¬@
Bf*
**
Af* Ò 
Subject to: 
ÔÕ
ÕÖ
ÕÕ
×Ñ)AB¬?Bf* = 1, ÇTQ	R = 1,2, … ,11)AB − )¾ ≤ 0, R, Ky ∈ 2	)AB + )¾ ≤ 1, R, Ky ∈ û)AB − )¾ = 0, R, Ky ∈ 	)AB ∈ (0,1.
 
where ÍA is the number of option for subsystem R. 
Finally, 159 Pareto-optimal solutions are identified by both methods which are 
shown in Figure 5.8. Figures 5.9 and Figure 5.10 show also the two dimensional 
representation of the solutions. 
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Table 5.6: Component parameters for each subsystem 
Subsystem Options Cost Weight Power 
 
Subsystem Options Cost Weight Power 
Subsys1 
Opt1_1 42 36 97 
Subsys7 
Opt7_1 98 38 7 
Opt1_2 35 60 24 Opt7_2 78 80 48 
Opt1_3 50 99 49 Opt7_3 54 27 79 
Opt1_4 49 62 67 Opt7_4 1 10 47 
Opt1_5 29 1 33 Opt7_5 84 38 47 
Subsys2 
Opt2_1 51 50 33 
Subsys8 
Opt8_1 28 25 8 
Opt2_2 54 93 21 Opt8_2 66 96 10 
Opt2_3 60 51 92 Opt8_3 1 32 26 
Opt2_4 92 57 66 Opt8_4 51 69 99 
Opt2_5 81 19 64 Opt8_5 15 95 52 
Subsys3 
Opt3_1 12 32 69 
Subsys9 
Opt9_1 95 19 93 
Opt3_2 70 28 71 Opt9_2 95 58 60 
Opt3_3 39 48 77 Opt9_3 9 18 96 
Opt3_4 48 21 55 Opt9_4 23 39 96 
Subsys4 
Opt4_1 66 86 53 Opt9_5 36 5 56 
Opt4_2 45 11 18 
Subsys10 
Opt10_1 54 64 43 
Opt4_3 7 29 84 Opt10_2 59 40 63 
Opt4_4 81 95 86 Opt10_3 61 5 11 
Opt4_5 100 32 99 Opt10_4 96 6 29 
Subsys5 
Opt5_1 82 66 94 
Subsys11 
Opt11_1 97 26 64 
Opt5_2 19 26 50 Opt11_2 60 6 87 
Opt5_3 72 21 34 Opt11_3 61 46 7 
Opt5_4 19 17 46 Opt11_4 87 84 26 
Opt5_5 58 62 95 Opt11_5 62 24 4 
Subsys6 
Opt6_1 56 35 36 
 Opt6_2 61 32 80 
Opt6_3 5 72 13 
 
For the adaptive % -constraint method, it needs to solve 1702 IP, while the proposed 
modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method only solves 454 IP. It improves the algorithm 
efficiency by	*Â+©æ©*ÂÁ+ = 73.3%, which is a significant improvement.  
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Figure 5.8: Cost vs Weight vs Power 
  
Figure 5.9: Cost vs Weight (left); Cost vs Power (right) 
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Figure 5.10: Weight vs Power 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we propose a modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method to identify all 
Pareto-optimal solutions for linear multi-objective optimization problem. Compared with 
existing methods, our method not only improves the algorithm efficiency significantly 
but also is able to cope with at most one non-integer linear objective function.  Based on 
the proposed optimization method, we present a system design optimization framework 
for simple structure systems (series/parallel) which have close-form reliability 
(availability) formulas. The presented framework is applied to a special case of system 
design optimization problem, the RAP of Series-Parallel system to evaluate its 
performance. Furthermore, the proposed optimization method is evaluated on a 
configuration selection problem taken from our industrial partner. Both numerical results 
show that the proposed method outperforms the existing methods, but the improvement is 
problem dependable.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
6.1 Contributions 
The contributions made in this dissertation are as follows: 
1. We have proposed a new CTBN formalism for RAM modeling of dynamic 
repairable systems. The previous work considered two main approaches: Dynamic 
Bayesian networks and Markov chain based models. Compared with DBNs, the 
CTBN framework belongs to the class of event-based BN formalisms which is 
essentially used for modeling reversible processes. Thus the advantage of CTBNs, 
over DBNs is their ability to handle various repair polices. Compared with 
Markov chain models, where each system state explicitly describes the state of all 
the system variables, CTBNs do not suffer from the state space explosion problem 
of Markov chain models. In particular, the CTBN is a local-state model, where the 
state of the current node is only dependent on its parent node. In short, CTBNs are 
more efficient and tractable than Markov chain models and also more suitable to 
model dynamic behavior among components than are DBNs.  
2. Based on the CTBN framework, we have proposed CTBN constructs for the static 
(Fault tree) and dynamic (Dynamic Fault tree) gates, typically found in reliability 
tools. Furthermore, we have shown how to model different repair policies using 
CTBNs. The CTBN RAM modeling framework is applied to model three case 
examples to estimate the system reliability and availability: the Cardiac system, 
the ground vehicle system and the fleet of vehicles system.  
112 
 
 
 
3. Based on the proposed CTBN RAM modeling formalism and NSGA-II, we 
present a system design optimization framework for dynamic repairable systems. 
The CTBNs are employed to estimate system reliability (availability) while the 
meta-heuristic optimization method NSGA-II is used to solve the black-box 
multi-objective optimization problem.  The CTBNs and NSGA-II based system 
design framework is applied to a ground vehicle system to identify the Pareto 
solution set. 
4. We propose a modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method which is able to identify all 
Pareto-optimal solutions for integer linear multi-objective optimization problem. 
Compared with the existing ϵ-constraint method, the proposed one improves the 
algorithm efficiency significantly by avoiding solving for the duplicate solutions. 
Furthermore, in the application to the RAP, the proposed method is adjusted to 
cope with linear multi-objective optimization problem with one non-integer 
objective function.   
5. We regard the typical system design problem, the RAP of Series-Parallel systems, 
as a multi-objective optimization problem. Consequently, we utilize the proposed 
modified adaptive ϵ-constraint method and the decomposition scheme to cope 
with this Multi-Objective Redundancy Allocation Problem (MORAP). Compared 
with existing MORAP methods, the main advantage of the proposed method is 
that it is able to identify all Pareto-optimal solutions. The modified adaptive ϵ-
constraint method is evaluated on the RAP of Series-Parallel systems and the 
configuration selection problem. 
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6.2 Future Research 
The following is a list of avenues for future research: 
1. The CTBN RAM modeling framework, as defined in this work, is primarily 
geared towards the modeling of systems whose component failure time and 
repair time follows exponential distribution. The Markovian property assumption 
restricts the expressive power of CTBNs to model non-exponential distribution 
over time. There are two possible ways to cope with non-exponential distribution 
processes. The first one is to use the Phase-type distribution (Nodelman 2007) to 
map the non-exponential process into several exponential processes; the second 
one is to add hidden variables (Nodelman 2007) as parent nodes to the non-
exponential nodes to control their evolution. However, both of these approaches 
will add complexity and computation burden to the model. Thus, finding a new 
and efficient way for CTBNs to cope with non-exponential distribution processes 
would allow a broader use for CTBNs in the RAM modeling applications. 
2. In the CTBNs and NSGA-II based multi-objective system design optimization 
framework, the meta-heuristic based NSGA-II has limitations of not being able 
to identify all Pareto-optimal solution and to guarantee the solutions are Pareto-
optimal. It would be very intriguing to find an optimization method which can 
break these limitations for the black-box multi-objective system design problem.  
3. Compared with the existing ϵ-constraint method, the modified adaptive ϵ-
constraint method, as proposed in this work, is able to improve the algorithm 
efficiency by avoiding solving the majority of duplicate solutions. However, the 
proposed method, while reducing the identification of duplicate solutions 
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significantly, cannot avoid all duplicated solutions. The investigation of 
incorporating a more sophisticated checking mechanism into the proposed 
method so that it can avoid all the duplicated solutions is definitely a worthwhile 
task to undertake in the future.   
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Recent growth in the scale and complexity of products and technologies in such 
the defense and other industries as the defense is has become a challenge for attaining 
cost efficiency in challenging product development, realization, and sustainment costs. 
Uncontrolled costs and routine budget overruns are forcing companies  causing all parties 
involved to seek become leaner in their product development processes and treatment to 
treat products’ of reliability, availability, and maintainability of the system as a true 
“design parameter”. To this effect, accurate estimation and management of the system 
reliability of a design during the “earliest stages” of new product development is critical 
not only critical for managing product development and manufacturing costs but also to 
for controlling life cycle costs (LCC). In this regard, the overall objective of this research 
study is to develop an integrated framework for “design for reliability” (DFR) upfront 
during the upfront product development by treating reliability as a design parameter. The 
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aim here is to develop the theory, methods, and tools necessary for: 1) accurate 
assessment of system reliability and availability and 2) optimization of the design to meet 
system reliability targets. In modeling the system reliability and availability, we aim to 
address the limitations of existing methods, in particular the Markov chains method and 
the Dynamic Bayesian Network approach, by incorporating a Continuous Time Bayesian 
Network framework for more effective modeling of sub-system/component interactions, 
dependencies, and various repair policies. We also propose a multi-object optimization 
scheme to aid the designer in obtaining identifying the optimal design(s) with respect to 
system reliability/availability targets and other system design requirements. In particular, 
the optimization scheme would entail optimal selection of sub-system and component 
alternatives. The theory, methods, and tools to be developed will be are extensively tested 
and validated using simulation test-bed data and actual case studies from our industry 
applications. 
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